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ABSTRACT
An intricately intertwined network of corporate manufacturers,
independently-owned dealers, suppliers, and workers, the U.S. auto industry
has been a staple of the American economy for the better part of the last
century. However, in the wake of globalization, ever-increasing foreign
competition, and the Financial Crisis, only governmental intervention has
allowed the U.S. auto industry to remain viable over the last decade. But did
the governmental intervention achieve its intended purpose? And, in the
long run, is governmental intervention the only answer to shield a fledgling
U.S. auto industry from the ebbs and flows of a global economy? Perhaps
the source of the U.S. auto industry’s viability issues does not lie within the
macro-level circumstances that surround it—but, rather, in the franchise
business model it utilizes.
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INTRODUCTION
For a century, the U.S. auto industry has relied on a traditional business
model of selling cars through local dealerships. This business model has
usually worked well. However, the latest financial crisis and worst recession
since the Great Depression (hereinafter, the “Financial Crisis”) necessitated
governmental intervention to resuscitate the industry.1 Revived U.S.
1. Matt Egan, 2008: Worse Than the Great Depression, CNN MONEY (Aug. 27, 2014),
http://money.cnn.com/2014/08/27/news/economy/ben-bernanke-great-depression/
[https://perma.cc/5F98-HWJ3]. One can measure the severity of the economic downturn for
the U.S. auto industry not only in money itself, but in terms of how events necessitated
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automakers now face a quandary: either continue the relatively comfortable,
century-old business model that nearly led, save governmental action, to the
demise of the U.S. auto industry, or seek alternatives to producing cars and
selling those cars through local dealerships. The Financial Crisis taught
Chrysler, General Motors, and Ford—Detroit’s “Big Three” automakers—
lessons leading to profound changes in how each company does business. In
this article, we ask: did the bailout of 2009 actually work, and—more
importantly—is it time for the U.S. auto industry to do away with its business
model of using local dealerships (independently-owned franchises) to sell its
vehicles? If not, or if so, is this business model the very reason why the U.S.
auto industry will inevitably, as we have seen more than once in the past,
need a bailout? We answer these questions in the affirmative, examine the
Financial Crisis and its impact on the U.S. auto industry both during and
after, and suggest that a change to current state laws prohibiting direct sales
from auto manufacturers to consumers could lead to greater long-term
financial stability for the U.S. auto industry.
I. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
We first turn to the Financial Crisis on a macro-level and analyze the
events that led to one of the deepest recessions in U.S. history. We then
examine the impact of the Financial Crisis on the U.S. auto industry in
particular, and why each of the Big Three automakers were hit the hardest,
necessitating, in one form or another, a governmental bailout of each.
A. The Financial Crisis and the U.S. Economy: A Parade of Horribles
In July 2007, the collapse of two Bear Stearns hedge funds, capitalized
at $1.6 billion, marked the beginning of what some commentators have
called the Great Recession (more popularly known as the Financial Crisis).2
The collapse of Bear Stearns and its eventual government-brokered and
guaranteed forced sale to J.P. Morgan Chase in March 2008 would only be
the beginning of a series of events and decisions that tanked the U.S.

governmental intervention to resuscitate the industry. Due to the singular nature of that
particular severe economic downturn, the phrase “Financial Crisis” will be capitalized
throughout this article to distinguish it from other downturns and to specify that specific crisis:
the recession which commenced in the latter half of 2007 or early 2008 and was unusually
extensive in both effects and length of time.
2. See Anthony Page, Revisiting the Causes of the Financial Crisis, 47 IND. L. REV. 37,
42 (2014) (identifying the start of the Financial Crisis as the moment after the collapse of two
Bear Stearns hedge funds).
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economy.3 In September 2008, the U.S. government was forced to put two
mortgage giants, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, under “conservatorship”
when the two companies saw $12 billion in losses since the summer of 2007
and both companies, combined, guaranteed about $5.4 trillion in home
loans—-about half the mortgage debt of the entire United States.4 Soon after,
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (“Lehman Brothers”), the fourth largest U.S.
investment bank, would add itself to the ranks of failed financial institutions.5
3. Id. at 43. During this forced sale, JP Morgan Chase initially agreed to pay $2 per
share to buy all of Bear Stearns’ stock, with $30 billion of Bear Stearns’ most toxic assets
guaranteed by the federal government. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, JP Morgan Pays $2 a Share
for Bear Stearns, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/
03/17/business/17bear.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/2YL2-JS55] (outlining JP
Morgan’s initial offer to buyout Bear Stearns). A week later, JP Morgan Chase revised its
initial bid and agreed to pay $10 per share for Bear Stearns’ stock in an attempt to pacify both
Wall Street and discontent Bear Stearns’ shareholders, with the federal government
guaranteeing only $29 billion of Bear Stearns’ assets on a nonrecourse basis. See Andrew
Ross Sorkin, JP Morgan Raises Bid for Bear Stearns to $10 a Share, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24,
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/24/business/24deal-web.html?pagewanted=all&_r
=0 [https://perma.cc/S5W6-R6NU] (detailing JP Morgan’s revised bid to buy out Bear
Stearns). A year prior to the forced sale, the company’s stock was selling for $170 a share.
Andrew Ross Sorkin, JP Morgan Pays $2 a Share for Bear Stearns, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17,
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/17/business/17bear.html?pagewanted=all [https://p
erma.cc/2YL2-JS55].
4. See David Ellis, U.S. Seizes Fannie and Freddie, CNN MONEY (Sept. 7, 2008),
http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/07/news/companies/fannie_freddie/ [https://perma.cc/3VGLUUNN] (discussing the U.S. government’s acquisitions of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
during the Financial Crisis). The move, which extended about $200 billion in treasury funds
to the two companies, marked a dramatic attempt by the U.S. government to gain some control
over the crumbling housing and financial markets. Id. According to Henry Paulson, former
U.S. Treasury Secretary, “[a] failure [of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac] would affect the ability
of Americans to get home loans, auto loans, and other consumer credit and business
finance . . . and a failure would be harmful to economic growth and job creation.” Id. Under
the conservatorship, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”) would take control of
the boards of both companies and the CEOs of each company would be replaced by
individuals appointed by the FHFA. Id. The U.S. Treasury would also buy mortgage-backed
securities from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and buy the preferred stock of the two companies
to provide security to the debt holders of the two companies and bolster additional housing
finance. Id. At the time, U.S. government sources said the conservatorship amounted to “a
timeout, not a liquidation . . . leav[ing] all options open for the next administration.” Id.
However, as of February 2018, the FHFA is still acting as conservator of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac because, according to the FHFA, each company lacks capital, cannot rebuild its
capital base, and “is operating on a remaining, finite financial commitment from taxpayers.”
FHFA As Conservator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE
AGENCY,
http://www.fhfa.gov/Conservatorship/Pages/History-of-Fannie-Mae--FreddieConservatorships.aspx [https://perma.cc/4XCE-HFKK] (last visited Nov. 26, 2018); see also
GARY STRUMEYER, THE CAPITAL MARKETS: EVOLUTION OF THE FINANCIAL ECOSYSTEM 244
(2018) (discussing the overall FHFA rules and principles).
5. Page, supra note 2, at 43.
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On September 14, 2008, Lehman Brothers filed for relief under Chapter 11
of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code,6 marking the beginning of what would be the
largest bankruptcy in U.S. history, after the company was unable to find a
buyer to take over the company and its toxic mortgage assets or to procure
financial assistance from the U.S. government.7 That same day, Bank of
America agreed to buy Merrill Lynch for $50 billion, or $29 a share, when
the 94-year-old company saw $39 billion in losses and write-downs
primarily from mortgage-contaminated securities.8 On September 16, 2008,
in the wake of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, the U.S. government
decided to bail out American International Group Inc. (“AIG”), one of the
world’s largest insurance companies, in an $85 billion deal to prevent the
potential collapse of the U.S. financial system.9 In the weeks that followed,
the prospects of other financial institutions also began to wane.10 On
September 26, 2008, the U.S. government seized Washington Mutual, a
former Seattle-based national retail bank that desperately needed cash after
a wave of consumer deposit withdrawals. The U.S. government then sold

6. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (2014) (allowing debtors who are not insolvent, in that
their liabilities do not exceed their assets, to seek relief from a bankruptcy court and obtain
confirmation from the court of a reorganization plan to provide for discharge of their debts
with creditors).
7. Page, supra note 2, at 42-43; see also Andrew Ross Sorkin, Lehman Files for
Bankruptcy, Merrill Is Sold, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/
15/business/15lehman.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/F7U2-287Y] (reporting on
Lehman Brothers filing for bankruptcy protection); The two most interested buyers in Lehman
Brothers were Bank of America and Barclays. Id. Bank of America walked away, however,
when the U.S. government refused to provide a financial backstop to potential buyers, a
decision in stark contrast to the guarantees the U.S. government provided during the Bear
Stearns forced sale to J.P. Morgan Chase a few months prior. Id. Similarly, after 72 hours of
negotiations with U.S. officials and some opposition to the purchase from the British
Government, Barclays, a British bank, also determined that it would not be in the best interests
of the company or its shareholders to buy Lehman Brothers. Id; see also Andrew Ross Sorkin,
What Might Have Been, and the Fall of Lehman, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2013),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/09/09/what-might-have-been-and-the-fall-of-lehman/
[https://perma.cc/J68G-BLT7] (recounting how the British government did not approve the
Barclays acquisition).
8. See Chris Isidore, Bank of America to Buy Merrill Lynch, CNN MONEY (Sept. 21,
2008), https://money.cnn.com/2008/09/15/news/companies/merrill_bofa_deal [https://perma
.cc/N8VU-2HQE] (outlining Bank of America’s attempt to acquire Merrill Lynch).
9. Edmund L Andrews, Michael J. de la Merced & Mary Williams Walsh, Fed’s $85
Billion Loan Rescues Insurer, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/
09/17/business/17insure.html (detailing the U.S. takeover of AIG).
10. See Associated Press, WaMu Is Seized, Sold Off in Biggest Bank Failure in U.S.
History, FOX NEWS (Sept. 26, 2008), https://www.foxnews.com/story/wamu-seized-sold-offin-biggest-bank-failure-in-u-s-history (noting other financial institution failures in the wake
of the Financial Crisis).
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Washington Mutual’s operations to J.P. Morgan Chase for $1.9 billion,
marking it as the largest bank failure in U.S. history.11 The following month,
Wells Fargo, the largest West Coast bank in the United States, agreed to
acquire its rival, Wachovia, for $15.1 billion in an attempt to avoid
Wachovia’s failure and another government seizure of a U.S. financial
institution.12
Even such a brief cataloguing of catastrophe may illustrate that the
causes of the Financial Crisis are many. Some commentators believe that a
credit crunch precipitated the Financial Crisis when major financial
institutions refused to lend to each other.13 Another spark was the use of
complex financial derivatives.14 The corresponding overinvestment, hence
bubble, in real estate eventually burst due to widespread defaults in the
subprime mortgage market.15 In the decade preceding the Financial Crisis,
underwriting standards and income requirements for subprime mortgages
had deteriorated.16 Mortgage lenders lent to households that did not have
adequate income to pay back their loans.17 These financial institutions not
only issued the subprime mortgage loans, but they also issued to investors
securities backed by these subprime mortgage loans.18 The income stream
11. Id. In the deal, J.P. Morgan Chase agreed to assume Washington Mutual’s loan
portfolio which contained about $307 billion in assets. Id.
12. Eric Dash, Wells Fargo to Pay $15.1 Billion for Wachovia, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3,
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/03/business/worldbusiness/03iht-03bank.166648
09.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/98PG-HDCX] (detailing Wells Fargo’s buyout of
Wachovia).
13. See Page, supra note 2, at 39 (discussing the varying views of commentators
concerning the cause of the Financial Crisis).
14. What Is a Subprime Mortgage?, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, (Mar. 3, 2012),
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb/110/what-is-a-subprime-mortgage.html
[https://perma.cc/TLR3-MFGU]; Page, supra note 2, at 39, 44-45.
15. See Page, supra note 2, at 39 (discussing the domino effect caused by the bursting of
the real estate bubble). Subprime mortgage loans carry an interest rate higher than the rates
of prime mortgage loans. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 14. Mortgage lenders
typically offer prime mortgage loans to borrowers with the best credit histories, which can
either be fixed or adjustable rate loans. Id. In comparison, subprime mortgage loans are
adjustable rate mortgage loans where the interest rate for the mortgage loan can significantly
increase over time. Id. Mortgage lenders offer subprime mortgage loans to prospective
borrowers with poor credit histories. Id. The higher interest rate for these loans is intended
to compensate the mortgage lender for accepting the greater credit risk associated with lending
to such borrowers. Id.
16. William Poole, Causes and Consequences of the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009, 33
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 421, 424 (2010) (finding that standards regarding subprime
mortgages weakened, leading to the Financial Crisis).
17. Id.
18. See Page, supra note 2, at 44 (revealing that many of the financial institutions also
bought securities backed by mortgages).
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for investors and the value of the mortgage-backed securities depended on
the borrowers of the underlying subprime mortgage continuing to pay his or
her loan.19 Even worse, investment banks found that they could package
these mortgage-backed securities to investors via another form of complex
financial derivatives called a collateral debt obligation (“CDO”).20 These
CDOs were yet another step removed from the actual subprime mortgages
themselves.21 The structure was a house of cards, dropped onto shifting
sands. Seizing upon the AAA-ratings provided by the ratings agencies, and
assuming that those highly-rated securities were low-risk, many private
investors purchased these securities, which were CDOs, at face value; to
make matters worse, they doubled down even more on their investments by
loading their financial portfolios with such securities.22 Financial institutions
did the same and bought these securities believing that the AAA-rating
meant a good return at very low risk.23 Additionally, financial institutions
treated the securities favorably as capital and diversified their financial
portfolios with these financial instruments.24
Unfortunately, when
widespread subprime mortgage borrowers began defaulting on their loans,
the CDOs and underlying mortgage-backed securities rapidly lost value,
forcing many financial institutions to write down the value of their assets
and, as a result, reduce their capital.25 Lehman Brothers is a good example
of this outcome.26 Investors, by comparison, simply lost their shirts.27

19. Id. at 44-45.
20. Poole, supra note 16. CDOs were structured obligations with several tranches of
differing risk and return composed of “pooled” mortgage assets. Id. Senior-level tranches
had first priority on the mortgage interest and principal payments made by subprime mortgage
borrowers while more junior-level tranches assumed higher risk and less priority on mortgage
interest and principal payments by subprime mortgage borrowers but received higher returns.
Id. Senior-level tranches, at the time, had a AAA-rating from rating agencies. Id. See
generally Joshua D. Coval, Jakub Jurek & Erik Stafford, The Economics of Structured
Finance 11-12 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 09-060, 2008), available at
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/09-060.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q83Z-9JHG]
(simulating the types of tranches observed in structured finance markets).
21. Page, supra note 2, at 44.
22. Page, supra note 2, at 44; Poole, supra note 16; see also Ed deHaan, The Financial
Crisis and Corporate Credit Ratings, 92 ACCOUNTING REV. 161 (July 2017) (discussing the
instrumentality of the rating agencies in the Financial Crisis).
23. Page, supra note 2, at 45.
24. Id. at 46.
25. Id. at 46-47.
26. Id.; see also supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
27. Poole, supra note 16; see also Page, supra note 2, at 45-46 (describing the reaction
of investors to the collapse of Lehman Brothers).
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B. The Financial Crisis and the U.S. Auto Industry
The ripple effect of the Financial Crisis was felt around the world.
European banks and markets were just as affected as those in the United
States.28 Similarly, Asian banks and markets also felt the pinch of the
Financial Crisis.29 Around the world, output and employment fell.30 In the
United States, the ripple effect of the Financial Crisis was felt across all
sectors of the economy.31 In particular, for the U.S. auto industry, the
Financial Crisis only exacerbated an already existing slump in competition.32
On a macro level, the Big Three automakers, General Motors, Chrysler,
and Ford, had slowly been losing market share to foreign competitors for
years.33 Rising fuel prices further softened demand for American cars in the
United States, while the rising legacy costs of the Big Three only constrained
each company’s ability to increase its competitiveness in the global market.34
These legacy costs, which are retiree costs the automobile companies pay
their former employees, include healthcare for life, which amounts to an
extra $16-$18 per hour on top of the hourly wages already paid.35 The
problems in the financial sector that precipitated the credit crunch36 made it
28. Poole, supra note 16, at 423; see also The Origins of the Financial Crisis: Crash
Course, ECONOMIST (Sept. 7, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/schoolsbrief/2158453
4-effects-financial-crisis-are-still-being-felt-five-years-article [https://perma.cc/5DAX-F37J]
(detailing the impact of the Financial Crisis on European companies, banks and markets).
29. Poole, supra note 16, at 423; see also The Origins of the Financial Crisis: Crash
Course, supra note 28 (providing an overview of the impact of the Financial Crisis on Asian
companies, banks and markets).
30. Poole, supra note 16, at 423.
31. Id.
32. STAFF OF CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, 111TH CONG., SEPTEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT:
THE USE OF TARP FUNDS IN THE SUPPORT AND REORGANIZATION OF THE DOMESTIC
AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 3 (Comm. Print 2009) [hereinafter “CONGRESSIONAL REPORT”]; see
also Jim Henry, U.S. Auto Sales Fell 18% in 2008, CBS NEWS (Jan. 5, 2009), https://www.c
bsnews.com/news/us-auto-sales-fell-18-percent-in-2008/ (citing credit , and a widespread
public mood of spending less as additional reasons for the overall slump in U.S. auto sales).
33. CONGRESSIONAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 1; see also Daniel Gross, Why Ford, GM
and Chyrsler Need a Bailout?, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 12, 2008), https://www.newsweek.com/wh
y-ford-gm-and-chrysler-need-bailout-84665 (noting the financial troubles of the three largest
U.S. automakers: Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors).
34. CONGRESSIONAL REPORT, supra note 32; see also Gross, supra note 33 (explaining
the challenges faced by the Big Three automakers that led to the United States offering them
financial relief).
35. Jenny Gold, Cutting Worker Costs Key to Automaker’s Survival, NPR (Dec. 23,
2008), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=98643230 [https://perma.cc/R
MW4-C4W8]. Compare the extra $16-$18 per hour paid for legacy costs by American
companies to the $3 paid per hour by Japanese companies. Id.
36. See infra notes 2-27 and accompanying text.
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more difficult for consumers to get vehicle financing, resulting in lower
consumer spending and reduced demand for American cars.37 By 2008, U.S.
automotive sales had fallen to their lowest levels since 1982.38
At the end of 2008, Congress promulgated the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008, which established the Troubled Asset Relief
Program (“TARP,” or more popularly known as, “the bailout”).39 TARP
authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase troubled assets to
restore confidence in the economy and stimulate the flow of credit.40 Under
TARP, Congress authorized the U.S. Treasury to loan more than $700 billion
in funds to aid the ailing financial industry and, according to Henry Paulson,
former Secretary of the Treasury, “support financial-market stability.”41
However, in December 2008, the Bush Administration, despite its previous
opposition to the plan, announced that it would be lending some of the TARP
funds—approximately $17.4 billion—to a dying U.S. auto industry in order
to save jobs, protect the U.S. economy, and prevent the deepening of the
Financial Crisis.42
On a micro level, the failure of the U.S. auto industry necessarily starts
and ends with the company practices and overall business model of the Big
37. CONGRESSIONAL REPORT, supra note 32; see also Gross, supra note 33 (talking about
the various factors leading to the financial failure of the Big Three automakers).
38. CONGRESSIONAL REPORT, supra note 32. The lowest point for auto sales apparently
came the following year, in 2009, before, they started to pick up. Bertel Schmitt, U.S. Car
Sales in 2009: Worst in 27 Years, TRUTH ABOUT CARS (Jan. 5, 2010), http://www.thetruthab
outcars.com/2010/01/u-s-car-sales-in-2009-worst-in-27-years/
[https://perma.cc/DAN9A6Y4]; Chris Isidore, Auto Sales Worst in 26 Years, CNN MONEY (Feb. 3, 2009),
http://money.cnn.com/2009/02/03/news/companies/auto_sales/index.htm?postversion=2009
020314 [https://perma.cc/UE96-55N6]; Nick Carey & David Bailey, U.S. Auto Sales Seen At
27-Year Low, REUTERS (Jan. 13, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-autoshowautosales-outlook-sb-idUSTRE50C3T420090113 [https://perma.cc/9S7J-LM2M]; see also
Gross, supra note 33 (explaining the depths the companies had reached at the time of the
Financial Crisis).
39. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5201 et seq. (2008).
40. See In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 89 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (authorizing the
Secretary of Treasury to purchase troubled assets to generate confidence in the economy).
41. See Paulson Seeks Second $350 Billion in Bailout Funds, REUTERS (Dec. 19, 2008),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-autos-bailout-paulson-sb/paulson-seeks-second-350billion-in-bailout-funds-idUSTRE4BI3M220081219 (describing Treasury Secretary Henry
Paulson’s rationale for providing the Big Three with additional bailout funds).
42. Id. According to President Bush, “[u]nder ordinary economic circumstances, I would
say this is the price that failed companies must pay, and I would not favor intervening to
prevent the auto makers from going out of business, . . . [b]ut these are not ordinary
circumstances. In the midst of a financial crisis and a recession, allowing the U.S. auto
industry to collapse is not a responsible course of action.” Transcript: President Bush on
Auto-Industry Bailout, FOX NEWS (Dec. 19, 2008), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/transc
ript-president-bush-on-auto-industry-bailout
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Three.
C. The Big Three
1. Chrysler
On April 30, 2009, the U.S. Treasury Department put Chrysler into
bankruptcy in an effort to restructure the company and prepare it for longterm survival.43 The filing in a Manhattan federal court marked the first time
in U.S. history that a major U.S. automaker filed for bankruptcy.44 At the
time of the filing, the 85-year-old company boasted 55,000 employees with
an additional 140,000 workers spread throughout its sprawling network of
3,200 independent franchise dealers selling Chrysler, Dodge, and Jeep
brands nationwide.45 Of the 55,000 direct employees, about 38,500 were
based in the United States, with nearly 70 percent covered under a collective
bargaining agreement.46 The company also paid for health care and other
related benefits to over 106,000 retirees.47 Chrysler also had 32
manufacturing and assembly facilities and 24 parts depots worldwide,
producing approximately 2 million vehicles under the Chrysler, Dodge, and
Jeep brands annually.48 Despite such lofty numbers, in 2009, Chrysler’s
sales were down’, falling behind both Toyota and Honda in U.S. sales.49
At the time of the bankruptcy, Chrysler owed billions to several groups
43. Chris Isidore, Chrysler Files for Bankruptcy, CNN Money (May 1, 2009),
http://money.cnn.com/2009/04/30/news/companies/chrysler_bankruptcy [https://perma.cc/P
2U2-Q2PS] [hereinafter “Chrysler Files for Bankruptcy”]; see also In re Chrysler LLC, 405
B.R. at 88 (discussing the reach and size of the Chrysler brand in the United States).
44. Chrysler Files for Bankruptcy, supra note 43. Chrysler had decades earlier received
a loan guarantee but had not declared bankruptcy. In December 1979, Congress approved a
$1.5 billion federal loan guarantee for Chrysler. JAMES M. BICKLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
7-5700, CHRYSLER CORPORATION LOAN GUARANTEE ACT OF 1979: BACKGROUND,
PROVISIONS, AND COST 4 (2008). The loan was ultimately repaid, with the warrants received
by the federal government, as part of the assistance, sold at auction for $311 million and—in
effect—garnering a profit for the government. Id.
45. Chrysler Files for Bankruptcy, supra note 43“”; see also In re Chrysler LLC, 405
B.R. at 88 (discussing the reach and size of the Chrysler brand in the United States).
46. In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. at 88-89.
47. Id. at 90. These are the legacy costs, which tend to be a far greater proportion of
labor costs for longstanding employers, particularly in strongly unionized, manufacturing
firms. The need for employees has gone down due to increased productivity per employee,
the use of robots, and other factors (perhaps less demand for the product), but there used to
be far more employees, many now retired and collecting benefits. See supra notes 34-35 and
accompanying text.
48. In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. at 90-91.
49. Chrysler Files for Bankruptcy, supra note 43.
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of creditors.50 First, Chrysler owed close to $7 billion to a syndicate of
lenders and suppliers who held a first priority security interest in
substantially all of Chrysler’s assets.51 Second, Chrysler owed $2 billion to
affiliates of its equity shareholders that held second priority in substantially
all of Chrysler’s assets.52 Third, Chrysler owed $4.27 billion to the U.S.
Treasury Department pursuant to TARP and the Canadian government, both
of which held a third priority security interest in substantially all of
Chrysler’s assets.53 Fourth, Chrysler owed $10 billion to a trust established
to provide health care benefits to union retirees.54 This debt was unsecured.55
Finally, Chrysler owed approximately $5 billion in unsecured debt to various
trade creditors with billions more owed in connection with various warranty
and dealer obligations.56 Not surprisingly, in the year preceding the
bankruptcy filing, the company had approximately $39.3 billion in assets and
$55.2 billion in liabilities.57 In addition, despite earning $48.5 billion in
revenues that year, the company had a net loss of $16.8 billion.58
These numbers, however, only tell part of the story. Following World
War II, Chrysler was known for its well-engineered cars.59 However, by the
late 1970s, the company began having financial troubles that resulted in a
bailout from Congress.60 Chrysler paid off its loans in the early 1980s due,
in large part, to the success of its minivans and fuel-efficient K-cars.61 In
1987, Chrysler bought the No. 4 automaker, American Motors.62
50. A. Joseph Warburton, Understanding the Bankruptcies of Chrysler and General
Motors: A Primer, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 531, 534 (2010); Chrysler Files for Bankruptcy,
supra note 45.
51. Warburton, supra note 50; Chrysler Files for Bankruptcy, supra note 45.
52. Warburton, supra note 50.
53. Id.
54. Id. The $10 billion commitment to the trust came after a settlement the company
reached in 2008 with the International Union, United Automobile Aerospace, and Agricultural
Implement Workers. Id. As a part of the settlement, Chrysler agreed to keep the trust funded
with cash. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 89 (noting that the company’s assets were less than
its liabilities).
58. Id.
59. Micheline Maynard, Chrysler: A Short History, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2009), http://w
ww.nytimes.com/2009/05/01/business/01history.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/GJU2-EDVE].
60. Id.; Judmi Miller, Congress Approves a Compromise Plan on Aid to Chrysler, N.Y.
TIMES Dec. 21, 1979, at A1.
61. Maynard, supra note 59; John Holusha, Iacocca Rides High in Detroit, N.Y. TIMES
Aug. 29, 1982, at. F1.
62. Maynard, supra note 59; John Holusha, Chrysler is Buying American Motors; Cost
is $1.5 Billion, N.Y. TIMES Mar. 10, 1987, at A1.
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Unfortunately, the consolidation of the two companies, with resulting
business difficulties, led to Chrysler’ being restructured.63 By the 1990s,
Chrysler came roaring back again with the popular Dodge Viper sports car
and its Jeep lineup.64 In 1998, Chrysler was acquired by Daimler-Benz of
Germany and spent the 8 years that followed as DaimlerChrysler.65 By 2007,
inconsistent financial results and pressure from German shareholders
prompted Daimler to find a buyer and eventually sell the company to
Cerberus Capital Management, a large investment fund.66 Although the
company’s CEO at the time, Robert L. Nardelli, vowed to make Chrysler
strong again under the new ownership, the sales slump brought on by the
Financial Crisis in 2008 would prove to be too much for the company to
withstand, and bankruptcy became nothing short of inevitable.67
2. General Motors
Before the Financial Crisis, General Motors was the largest auto
manufacturer in the world, producing nine million cars in 34 countries.68 In
2008, the 101-year-old company had 463 subsidiaries with 234,500
employees, 91,000 of whom were American.69 The company also provided
health-care and pension benefits for more than 493,000 retired workers.70 In
the United States, the company spent more than $50 billion a year buying
parts from its network of 11,500 vendors and paid $476 million in monthly

F1.

63. Maynard, supra note 59.
64. Id.; James Bennet, The Designers Who Saved Chrysler, N.Y. TIMES Jan. 30, 1994, at

65. Maynard, supra note 59; Keith Bradsher, Shaping a Global Giant: The Industry;
Risking Labor Trouble and Clash of Cultures, 2 Makers Opt for Size, N.Y. TIMES May 7,
1998, at A1.
66. Maynard, supra note 59; Mark Landler & Micheline Maynard, Chrysler Group to Be
Sold for $7.4 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/15/auto
mobiles/15chrysler-web.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/LY4K-Y9E2].
67. Maynard, supra note 59. Post-bankruptcy, Chrysler emerged a new entity with the
United Autoworkers Trust, Fiat, the U.S. Treasury, and the Canadian government each
owning an equity stake in the company of 55 percent, 35 percent, 8 percent, and 2 percent,
respectively. Warburton, supra note 50, at 535-536.
68. A Giant Falls, ECONOMIST (June 4, 2009), http://www.economist.com/node/1378294
2 [https://perma.cc/D4Z9-ANR2]; see also Janet E. Kerr, The Financial Meltdown of 2008
and the Government’s Intervention: Much Needed Relief or Major Erosion of American
Corporate Law? The Continuing Story of Bank of America, Citigroup, and General Motors,
85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 49, 67 (2011) (noting the extent of General Motors’ business before the
financial crisis).
69. A Giant Falls, supra note 68.
70. Id.
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salaries.71 To go along with its big spending, General Motors also had $172
billion in liabilities and only $82.2 billion in assets.72 To stop the bleeding,
in 2009, General Motors closed 11 factories, 40 percent of its 6,000
dealerships, and cut more than 20,000 jobs.73 Unfortunately, these measures
failed to suffice and, on June 1, 2009, General Motors filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy protection, triggering the largest industrial bankruptcy in U.S.
history.74 The bankruptcy filing came just months after the Obama
Administration had “laid out a framework for General Motors to achieve
viability that required the Company to rework its business plan, accelerate
its operational restructuring and make far greater reductions in its
outstanding liabilities.”75
The issues for General Motors, however, began well before the
Financial Crisis.76 From 1983 to 2008, the company’s market share fell from
close to 45 percent down to nearly 22 percent.77 Asian competitors, such as
Toyota, were making better quality cars more efficiently and at lower costs.78
In response, General Motors began to use various cost-cutting techniques to
remain competitive.79 These cost-cutting techniques resulted in the company
producing lower quality vehicles, which, over time, became less attractive to
customers.80 As demand for the company’s vehicles tumbled, so did the
71. Id.
72. Id.; see Insolvency, Black’s Law Dictionary 916 (10th ed. 2014) (explaining “balancesheet insolvency” where liabilities exceed assets); see also Kerr, supra note 68. One hallmark
of insolvency is whether a “debtor’s liabilities exceed its assets.” .
73. Kimberly Amadeo, Auto Industry Bailout: Was the Big 3 Bailout Worth It?, BALANCE
(Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.thebalance.com/auto-industry-bailout-gm-ford-chrysler3305670 [https://perma.cc/XPC5-R7L7].
74. A Giant Falls, supra note 68; Chris Isidore, GM Bankruptcy: End of an Era, CNN
MONEY (June 2, 2009), http://money.cnn.com/2009/06/01/news/companies/gm_bankruptcy/
[https://perma.cc/FC2K-D8PH] [hereinafter “GM Bankruptcy: End of an Era”].
75. Press Release, Fact Sheet on Obama Administration Auto Restructuring Initiative for
General Motors (May 31, 2009), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages
/tg179.aspx [https://perma.cc/D4T9-QKS3]; see also Barry E. Adler, A Reassessment of
Bankruptcy Reorganization After Chrysler and General Motors, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
305 (2010) (focusing mainly on how the bankruptcies of Chrysler and GM impacted
bankruptcy law, but two sections briefly discuss the bankruptcies of each company).
76. A Giant Falls, supra note 68.
77. Id.; see GM Bankruptcy: End of an Era, supra note 74 (noting the sharp decline in
GM’s market share in the last quarter of the 20th century).
78. A Giant Falls, supra note 68; cf. Sharon Silke Carty & USA Today, 7 Reasons GM
Is Headed to Bankruptcy, ABC NEWS (May 31, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story
?id=7721675 [https://perma.cc/C8CP-C7ZC] (arguing that GM’s discontinuation of its EV1
electric car program allowed Toyota to take the lead in the market for fuel efficient cars with
the Prius).
79. A Giant Falls, supra note 68.
80. Id.
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price the company could ask for its vehicles.81 To increase revenue, the
company’s management kept production high, maintained sales with costly
dealership incentives, and offered heavily discounted fleets.82 Nevertheless,
by the end of 2007, weakness in the U.S. housing market began infecting car
sales as well.83 As housing prices fell, many consumers began putting off
their purchases of new vehicles.84 Additionally, more willing buyers with
lower credit ratings found it increasingly difficult to obtain financing to buy
vehicles, whether new or used.85
Worse yet, during this time, U.S. gas prices nearly doubled.86 As
average gas prices soared to $4 per gallon, consumer demand for large
pickup trucks and sport utility vehicles (SUVs) dissipated.87 Large pickup
trucks and SUVs had been the bread and butter of the Big Three since their
inception88; however, as the Financial Crisis began, consumers wanted to
swap out these gas-guzzlers for smaller, more fuel-efficient vehicles.89 As a
result, the residual values for large pickup trucks and SUVs dramatically fell,
leaving the finance arm of General Motors with heavy losses after these
vehicles were returned, post-lease.90 After Lehman Brothers failed,91 vehicle
markets around the world suffered and the U.S. market was hit the hardest.92
By the end of 2008, sales for cars and trucks were 35.5 percent lower than
the prior year.93
Moreover, each year, General Motors diverted billions of dollars away
from the development of new models to, instead, pay the health care costs of
retired union workers.94 These health care costs added $1,400 to the total
81. Id.
82. Id.; see also Carty & USA Today, supra note 78 (contending that cash-back
programs, 0 percent financing, and generous rebates led to deal-focused rather than carfocused marketing and drastically decreased the residual value of GM vehicles).
83. A Giant Falls, supra note 68.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.; see Bill Powell, Gas Prices Dropping: The Good News and Bad News, TIME (Oct.
14, 2008), http://content.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1850413,00.html [https://
perma.cc/NW5M-PQJ8] (noting the price of gas in 2007 was approaching $5 per gallon in
many parts of the United States).
87. A Giant Falls, supra note 68; Ken Bensinger, Car Leasing Runs out of ($4-a-gallon)
Gas, L.A. TIMES (July 26, 2008), http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jul/26/business/ficarleases26 [https://perma.cc/M95C-67YA].
88. A Giant Falls, supra note 68.
89. Id.; Bensinger, supra note 87.
90. A Giant Falls, supra note 68.
91. See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
92. A Giant Falls, supra note 68; Bensinger, supra note 87.
93. A Giant Falls, supra note 68; Bensinger, supra note 87.
94. A Giant Falls, supra note 68; Silke, supra note 78.
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cost of each vehicle produced—and were costs that the company’s Asian and
European competitors did not have to sustain.95 By 2009, General Motors
had lost more than $80 billion despite four years of restructuring efforts and
was too weak to carry on without receiving billions of dollars along with a
bankruptcy from the U.S. government.96
3. Ford
Perhaps the strongest of the Big Three, Ford was able to withstand the
Financial Crisis, but it did not do so unscathed. Although Ford was neither
put into bankruptcy nor rendered a recipient of bailout funds as were its Big
Three competitors, Ford did receive $5.9 billion in low-cost government
loans from the U.S. government during the same time period in 2009 to fund
the overhaul of its factories and the innovation of fuel efficient
technologies.97 Moreover, Ford fully supported the Bush and Obama
Administrations in providing U.S. federal dollars to Chrysler and General
Motors.98 At the time, the U.S. government was the only entity that could
save Chrysler and General Motors because the banks, which were dealing
with their own financial crises,99 were unwilling to risk private capital to
assist the two ailing U.S. automakers.100
According to Steven Rattner, the former head of the Presidential Task
Force on the U.S. Auto Industry in 2009, “Ford would have closed because
it would not have been able to get parts, because the parts industry was in
arguably worse shape than the assemblers.”101 Moreover, the former Ford
CEO, Alan Mullaly, echoed Rattner’s sentiments stating, “if GM and
Chrysler had gone into free fall, they could have taken the United States from
a recession into a depression.”102 As such, Ford became an indirect
beneficiary of the bailout.103 Not surprisingly, Mullaly sat shoulder to
95. A Giant Falls, supra note 68.
96. Id.
97. Joann Muller, Ford Looks Hypocritical in New Anti-Bailout Commercial, FORBES
(Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/joannmuller/2011/09/19/ford-looks-hypocritic
al-in-new-anti-bailout-commercial/ [https://perma.cc/C4NN-AB2F].
98. Angela G. Keane, Ford Would Have Shut Without Auto Bailouts, Rattner Says,
AUTOMOTIVE NEWS (Oct. 9, 2012), https://www.autonews.com/article/20121009/OEM/1210
09878/ford-would-have-shut-without-gm-chrysler-aid-rattner-says.
99. See supra notes 2-13 and accompanying text.
100. See Keane, supra note 98 (explaining Ford avoiding the failure experienced by
General Motors and Chrysler as a result of President Barack Obama’s administration’s
policies).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., FORD MOTOR COMPANY, FORD MOTOR COMPANY BUSINESS PLAN

2018]

BANKRUPTCIES AND BAILOUTS

303

shoulder with the other CEOs of the Big Three when those three men went
to Capitol Hill in 2008 to plead their case for, in effect, a $25 billion
transfusion of industry-saving funds.104
On the company level, Ford also took some additional steps to avoid
the fate of Chrysler and General Motors.105 In particular, Ford had positioned
itself to abstain from the bailout because, in the years preceding the Financial
Crisis, the company had restructured its business side operations and pledged
most of its assets to obtain favorable long-term financing.106 With little
success, Ford also had tried to consolidate its large and concentrated
dealership system.107 In 2005, Ford (together with its subsidiaries Lincoln
and Mercury) had 4,396 dealers in total with 2,242 of those in its largest 130
markets.108 In its business plan submitted to the Senate Banking Committee
in 2008, Ford planned to reduce the overall number of its dealerships to 3,790
with 1,875 in its largest 130 markets.109 These efforts, however, cost the
company millions of dollars because many of the affected dealers exercised
SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE BANKING COMMITTEE 5 (2008), available at https://bigthreeauto.
procon.org/sourcefiles/Ford_Motor_Company_Business_Plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/3MBZ8HJ6] [hereinafter “FORD BUSINESS PLAN”] (stating that the U.S. automotive “industry is an
interdependent one, with broad overlap in supplier and dealer networks, [and that] the collapse
of one or both of [Ford’s] domestic competitors would threaten Ford as well.”).
104. See Muller, supra note 97 (describing Ford’s criticism of GM and Chrysler in an
advertising campaign); see also Josh Levs, Big Three Auto CEOs Flew Private Jets to Ask for
Taxpayer Money, CNN (Nov. 19, 2008), http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/11/19/autos.ceo.jets/
[https://perma.cc/N3NJ-YW9F] (describing the frustrations expressed by lawmakers towards
the CEOs of the Big Three who flew private jets to request taxpayer bailout money).
Ironically, the three CEOs came under a sandstorm of harsh criticism when each of the three
chose to fly to the hearing before Congress to beg for taxpayer money on corporate-sponsored
private jets. Id. One U.S. Representative commented that, “[t]here is a delicious irony in
seeing private luxury jets flying into Washington, D.C., and people coming off of them with
tin cups in their hand, saying that they’re going to be trimming down and streamlining their
businesses . . . [i]t’s almost like seeing a guy show up at the soup kitchen in high hat and
tuxedo.” Id. It was estimated that each of the three round trip private jet flights cost their
respective companies $20,000 each. Id. In contrast, a typical round trip commercial flight
from Detroit to Washington, D.C., would have cost each company about $500 per CEO. Id.
105. F. DUNNE ET AL., UNDERSTANDING THE CONGRESSIONAL AUTO BAILOUT: AN
IMMEDIATE LOOK AT THE LEGAL, GOVERNMENTAL, AND ECONOMIC RAMIFICATIONS OF THE
GOVERNMENT’S FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO AUTOMAKERS, 2009 ASPATORE SPECIAL REP. 5
(2009).
106. Id.
107. Id.; see also FORD BUSINESS PLAN, supra note 103 (stating that Ford believes that its
consolidation efforts have increased its financial strength). In its 2008 business plan, Ford
acknowledges that it is acutely aware that its supply base, labor structure, and dealer network,
among other factors, are sized for an industry and a market share that it, along with General
Motors and Chrysler, can no longer support. Id. at 5.
108. FORD BUSINESS PLAN, supra note 103, at 11.
109. Id.
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their termination rights under state franchise laws and sought compensation
from Ford for unlawfully terminating their dealerships.110 Similarly,
industry-wide attempts to have dealers voluntarily consolidate met much
resistance, as most dealers sought to maintain and protect their own
individual business interests.111 Thus, dealer saturation has always plagued
Ford and other members of the Big Three,112 and eliminating dealer
saturation may be the key to each company’s long-term sustainability.
II. THE U.S. FRANCHISE DEALER SYSTEM AND WHY IT IS A PROBLEM
FOR THE BIG THREE
We now examine the business model utilized by the Big Three. In
particular, we analyze the franchise dealer system, the legal and business
mechanics that govern the system, and the perpetual complexities and pitfalls
of that system.
A. The Franchise Dealer System
Historically, U.S. auto sales have been conducted via the machinery of
franchising.113 As a business model, franchising is a system of marketing
and distribution whereby an independent businessperson, the franchisee, is
granted certain legal rights to market and sell the goods and services of
another, the franchisor, in accordance with established standards and
practices.114 Under a typical franchising system, the franchisor obtains new
sources of capital, contracts with self-motivated entrepreneurs to sell its
110. Id.
111. DUNNE ET AL., supra note 105.
112. See Linebaugh, supra note 32 (explaining that domestic-brand dealers face the
problem of there being so many of them). For example, in the case of General Motors, the
company had 6,426 U.S. dealers in 2008 while its Japanese competitor, Toyota, had only
1,461 U.S. dealers. Id. Despite having significantly less dealers, Toyota’s U.S. sales still
equaled about 85 percent of the sales for General Motors. Id.
113. See Carla Wong McMillian, What Will It Take to Get You in a New Car Today?: A
Proposal for a New Federal Automobile Dealer Act, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 67, 69 (2009)
(describing the over-dealered market, poor product quality, and labor costs as reasons for the
failures of the automotive industry, which is historically based on a relationship shared
between dealers and manufacturers).
114. Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Terminations: Legal Rights and Practical Effects
When Franchisees Claim the Franchisor Discriminates, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 559, 559 (1998)
[hereinafter “Franchise Terminations”]; see also Dean Fournais, The Inadvertent Employer:
Legal and Business Risks of Employment Determinations to Franchise Systems, 27
FRANCHISE L.J. 224, 224 (2008) (explaining while it is generally understood that franchise
relationships are not strictly governed by employment law tests, there are certainly risks that
employment determinations present to the business model of franchising).
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products and services, and expands its business into new distribution
markets.115 In contrast, the franchisee acquires products, know-how, brand
name, and the stability of a larger enterprise without the associated risks and
pressures of building a business from scratch.116 In a sense, the franchisee is
able to gain the added benefit of, and piggyback on, the better name and
product recognition of the franchisor’s brand.117 Moreover, the franchisor
requires the franchisee to make significant investments in the franchised
business and facilities,118 which, in turn, provides the franchisee additional
motivation—perhaps even desperation—to succeed.119 Indeed, having some
skin in the game may incentivize the franchisee to make better business
decisions.120 Finally, the franchisee likely will know about the local market
115. Franchise Terminations, supra note 114, at 559–60.
116. Id. at 560.
117. Id.; see also Jeff Elgin, Top 10 Reasons to Buy a Franchise: Here’s How Franchises
Can Offer You a Jumpstart Toward Owning Your Own Business, ENTREPRENEUR (Dec. 7,
2007), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/188452 [https://perma.cc/6GLB-VZQL] (d
iscussing various reasons for choosing a franchise opportunity if an individual desires to own
his or her own business); CNN Live Saturday: “Dollar Signs”: Opening a Franchise (CNN
television broadcast Oct. 25, 2003) (transcript available at http://www.cnn.com/TRANSC
RIPTS/0310/25/cst.03.html [https://perma.cc/76WE-UVDX]) (describing the pros and cons
of beginning a franchise); Supercuts, Supercuts Ranked #1 Haircare Franchise, Fifth Overall
By Entrepreneur, PR NEWSWIRE (Dec. 17, 2014), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-re
leases/supercuts-ranked-1-haircare-franchise-fifth-overall-by-entrepreneur-300010977.htm
l [https://perma.cc/3XEA-DY2A] (noting that the growth and success of Supercuts is because
of their strong franchise brand name recognition). For example, we have all heard of a Big
Mac before. See, e.g., Gus Lubin, For National Cheeseburger Day, Find out What Sets a Big
Mac and a Whopper Apart, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.businessinsi
der.com/big-mac-v-whopper-on-national-cheeseburger-day-2013-9 [https://perma.cc/WZ5G
-RXMP] (detailing the advantages the Big Mac has over the Whopper due to branding and
exposure).
118. Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Contract Interpretation: A Two-Standard Approach,
2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 641, 691 (2013) [hereinafter “Franchise Contract Interpretation”]
(describing a survey of 100 franchise agreements which found that 72 of them specifically
provided that the franchisor can mandate franchisee improvements to the franchise location
and that these modifications are to be entirely at the expense of the franchisee).
119. ROGER D. BLAIR & FRANCINE LAFONTAINE, THE ECONOMICS OF FRANCHISING 133
(2005); see also McMillian, supra note 113, at 86 (alluding to franchisees as local
entrepreneurs who largely invest in their businesses and facilities, and this significant
investment serves as motivation to make their businesses succeed).
120. Ostensibly better business decisions, however, may not always be in the best interests
of the franchisor. For example, the franchisee may have an incentive to increase prices and
reduce quality to maximize her own profits. BLAIR & LAFONTAINE, supra note 119, at 86.
Such behavior may harm the profits of the franchisor as well as the franchise system. Id. As
the franchisee begins to cut corners in terms of the quality of products and service she
provides, customers may become alienated from the particular franchise location and seek
alternatives. Id. Moreover, customers expect product quality and service to be uniform across
different locations and may attribute the low-quality products and services to the franchise
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and consumers and, as such, be more equipped than an out-of-state
franchisor at selling the franchised products or services.121 Thus, when a
franchising system is functioning properly, the relationship between the
franchisor and the franchisee will be interdependent and mutually
advantageous to both parties.122 Similar to a partnership, both the franchisor
and the franchisee derive an economic benefit from the success of the
individual franchise.123
In the U.S. automobile context, the franchising system is composed of
two parties: the manufacturer (the franchisor) and the dealer (the
franchisee).124 Under this dealer system, the manufacturer is able to exert
great control over the distribution of its vehicles without the added burdens
and responsibilities of maintaining an agency relationship with the dealers.125
system as a whole. Id.; see also McMillian, supra note 113, at 86; Robert W. Emerson,
Franchise Goodwill: Take a Sad Song and Make it Better, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 349,
354-55 (2013) [hereinafter “Franchise Goodwill”] (discussing the “double-sided moral
hazard” between franchisors and franchisees, i.e., franchisees desire to maximize profits or
alternatively cut corners while relying on the franchise’s good reputation and the franchisors
risk of opportunism).
121. McMillian, supra note 113, at 86.
122. See Neptune T.V. & Appliance Serv., Inc. v. Litton Microwave Cooking Prods. Div.,
Litton Sys., Inc., 462 A.2d 595, 600–01 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983) (describing the
franchise relationship as “based on the complex of mutual and continuing advantages which
induced the franchisor to reach his ultimate consumer through entities other than his own
which, although legally separate, are nevertheless economically dependent upon him.”); see
also Missouri Beverage Co., Inc. v. Shelton Bros., Inc., 669 F.3d 873, 879 (8th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Neptune T.V. & Appliance Serv., Inc., 462 A.2d at 600-01); Boyle v. Vanguard Car
Rental USA, Inc., No. 08-6276(JBS/KMW), 2009 WL 3208310, at *6–7 (D.N.J. Sept. 30,
2009) (quoting Neptune T.V. & Appliance Serv., Inc., 462 A.2d at 600-01); Robert W.
Emerson & Jason R. Parnell, Franchise Hostages: God, Fast Food, and Politics, 29 J.L. &
POL. 353, 355 (2014) (outlining the harmful effects that political statements can have on the
economic interests of a franchise or franchise system).
123. See, e.g., Neptune T.V. & Appliance Serv., Inc., 462 A.2d at 600 (describing
franchising as a method of doing business which entails the advantages of an integrated
corporate network with those of individual business proprietorships); see also Kaeser
Compressors, Inc. v. Compressor & Pump Repair Servs., Inc., No. 09-C-521, 2011 WL
1900175, at *989–91 (E.D. Wis. May 19, 2011) (discussing the “continuing financial interest”
between franchisor and franchisee). Franchises are different from partnerships, however, in
that profits and losses are not shared equally between the franchisor and franchisee and that
one party is, in practice, “above” or otherwise leading the other: the franchisee follows a
specific, franchisor-created format or trade style using the franchisor’s trademarks and brand
name. GLADYS GLICKMAN, FRANCHISING §§ 2.01 & 2.03[7]-[8] (1982); see also Emerson &
Parnell, supra note 122, at 355 (noting that economic performance of a franchise can be
negatively impacted by political speech associated with the franchise name).
124. Friedrich Kessler, Automobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration by Contract,
66 YALE L.J. 1135, 1135-36 (1957).
125. Id. at 1136; see Stephen M. Fox, Two Roads Diverged: Tesla, Interruption, and the
Commerce Clause, 22 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. 152, 155 (2016) (noting the power discrepancy
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Moreover, the manufacturer is able to select the dealers who sell its vehicles,
choosing only those with an impressive potential for cultivating the local
market, achieving high sales, and servicing the vehicle products.126 In return,
the dealer receives from the manufacturer the added capacity to maintain and
strengthen a strong local retail business.127 In most instances, the
manufacturer will also assist the dealer in effectively merchandising the
vehicles.128 Furthermore, the dealer, like any franchisee, will gain increased
prestige through having an affiliation with a large organization with national
presence. 129
B. The Dealership Agreement
A franchising contract (the dealership agreement) generally governs the
manufacturer-dealer relationship and outlines the rights and duties between
both parties.130 For example, the dealership agreement may govern how the
dealer sells and services the manufacturer’s products, meets both sales
targets and customer service objectives, and performs certain warranty
services.131 The dealership agreement may also govern the vehicles and the
parts the manufacturer must supply to the dealer for sales and service,132 how
between the dealer and the manufacturer).
126. Kessler, supra note 124, at 1136; Roger M. Quinland, Has the Traditional
Automobile System Run out of Gas? FRANCHISE LAWYER, Summer 2013, available at https://
www.americanbar.org/groups/franchising/publications/franchise_lawyer/2013/summer_201
3/has_traditional_automobile_franchise_system_run_out_gas/ [https://perma.cc/X6EH-F27
5].
127. Kessler, supra note 124 at 136.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Fiat Motors of North America, Inc., 794
F.2d 213, 214 (6th Cir. 1986) (explaining a case which involved a dealer sales and service
agreement that outlined the mutual rights and obligations of the parties, including provisions
alluding to the repurchase of automobiles, parts, and equipment); Freedman Truck Center,
Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 784 F. Supp. 167, 177 n.6 (D.N.J. 1992); LaFontaine Saline
Inc. v. Chrysler Group LLC, 828 N.W.2d 446, 452-53 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012); Bero Motors v.
General Motors Corporation, No. 224190, 2001 WL 1167533, at *13 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 2,
2001); Van Wie Chevrolet, Inc. v. General Motors, LLC, 145 A.D.3d 1, 4 (N.Y. App. Div.
2016).
131. See DaimlerChrysler Motors Co. v. Clemente, 668 S.E.2d 737, 742 (Ga. Ct. App.
2008) (noting the breadth of dealership agreements); McMillian, supra note 113, at 86.
132. See, e.g., Link v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., 788 F.2d 918, 929 n.10 (3rd
Cir. 1986) (“These franchising documents contain several clauses relating to the supply and
pricing of Mercedes-Benz parts. The Dealer Agreement provides as follows: ‘MBNA will sell
to the Dealer and the Dealer will buy from MBNA Mercedes-Benz passenger cars, parts, and
products and assume the obligation of selling and promoting the sale of Mercedes-Benz
passenger cars, parts, and products in [a designated] nonexclusive area.’”).

308

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 21:2

the manufacturer reimburses the dealer for warranty services performed for
customers,133 and the manufacturer’s right to terminate the franchise.134
C. The Automobile Dealers’ Day in Court Act
The manufacturer-dealer relationship is also governed by federal and
state laws that often add to or, in some cases, supplant the express terms of
the dealership agreement.135 The Federal Automobile Dealers Franchise
Act,136 more popularly known as the Automobile Dealers’ Day in Court Act
(hereinafter, the “Day in Court Act”),137 is a federal law permitting dealers
to sue a manufacturer for damages caused by its failure to act in good faith
when performing or complying with the express terms of the dealership
agreement or, alternatively, in terminating, cancelling, or otherwise not
renewing the dealer’s franchise.138 Congress’ purpose in enacting the Day in
Court Act was to establish a balance of power between manufacturers and
dealers to curtail the heavy economic advantages of manufacturers139 that

133. See, e.g., In re Auto Dealer Services, Inc., 65 B.R. 681, 683 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1986)
(“The dealer agreement required each dealer to use its best efforts to sell warranty agreements
to persons who purchased new or used cars, to sell the service agreements without
modification at the rates set by debtor, to collect the purchase price of the service agreement
as the agent of debtor and to hold the proceeds in trust, to remit the proceeds to debtor bimonthly, to provide service for properly authorized warranty repair claims and to bill debtor
for this work within 30 days. In return, debtor was required to maintain and administer a
warranty service program, to authorize repairs in an expedient and timely manner, to maintain
detailed records as to each service agreement holder and for each dealer, and to honor the
repair claims submitted by dealers as to authorized warranty work. From the proceeds held in
trust, each dealer was allowed to withdraw an advance commission equal to 50 percent of the
purchase price of the service agreement.”).
134. See, e.g., Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Thomas Auto Co., Inc., 939 F.2d 538, 541 (8th
Cir. 1991) (describing a case in which Chrysler’s termination of the dealer’s franchise was
ruled to not be in violation of state statutes governing relationships between automobile
manufacturers and their dealers); Major Oldsmobile, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., No. 957585, 1996 WL 280452, at *3 (2d. Cir. May 17, 1996) (stating that if a manufacturer has a
legal right to terminate a dealer agreement, its ulterior motivations for doing so are irrelevant);
Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc., 794 F.2d at 220 (stating that termination rights flow from the
dealer agreement); General Motors Corp. v. New A.C. Chevrolet, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 733,
740 n.10 (D.N.J. 2000) (describing a manufacturer’s right to terminate a dealer agreement).
135. McMillian, supra note 113, at 70.
136. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-26 (2018).
137. Kotula v. Ford Motor Co., 338 F.2d 732, 733 (8th Cir. 1964); Arabian Motors Group
W.L.L. v. Ford Motor Company, No. 16–cv–13655, 162017 WL 676953 at *3 (E.D. Mich.
Jan. 19, 2017).
138. 15 U.S.C. § 1222 (2018).
139. Randy’s Studebaker Sales, Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 533 F.2d 510, 515
(10th Cir. 1976).
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enabled them to coerce and intimidate their dealers.140 In particular,
Congress sought to prevent manufacturers from forcing dealers to accept
automobiles, parts, accessories, and supplies, which the dealers did not need,
want, or believe they could absorb in their markets.141 As such, the Day in
Court Act provides dealers with judicial protection from such arbitrary
treatment and creates a new cause of action, separate from more traditional
contract claims,142 that allows judicial determination of the issues
irrespective of any dealership agreement terms or provisions and
manufacturer claims of waiver or estoppel.143 Thus, most effectively and as
its name suggests, the Day in Court Act provides dealers with the opportunity
to air their complaints and seek redress in court.
D. State Dealership Acts
In addition to the Day in Court Act, at the state level, many legislatures
have enacted statutes that further govern the manufacturer-dealer
140. Colonial Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 592 F.2d 1126, 1129 (10th Cir. 1979).
141. See Woodward v. General Motors Corp., 298 F.2d 121, 128 (5th Cir. 1962) (holding
that the dealer did not breach the automobile franchise agreement and is not liable to the
manufacturer); see also S. REP. NO. 2073, at 2 (1956) (noting the decline in auto production
and sales). According to the Federal Trade Commission: “[M]otor-vehicle manufacturers,
and, by reason of their great power, especially General Motors Corporation, Chrysler
Corporation and Ford Motor Co., have been, and still are, imposing on their respective dealers
unfair and inequitable conditions of trade, by requiring such dealers to accept, and operate
under, agreements that inadequately define the rights and obligations of the parties and are,
moreover, objectionable in respect to defect of mutuality; that some dealers, in fact, report
that they have been subjected to rigid inspections of premises and accounts, and to arbitrary
requirements by their respective motor-vehicle manufacturers to accept for resale, quantities
of motor vehicles or other goods, deemed excessive by the dealer, or to make investments in
operating plants or equipment without adequate guaranty as to term of agreement or even
supply of merchandise; and that adequate provisions are not included for an equitable method
of liquidation of such investments, sometimes made at the insistence of the respective motorvehicle manufacture.” 1939 FTC ANN. REP. 26.
142. See Hoffman Motors Corp. v. Alfa Romeo S.P.A., 244 F. Supp. 70, 77 (S.D.N.Y.
1965) (holding that an Italian corporation manufacturing automobiles was denied its motion
for dismissal for complaints made against it by a franchise dealer for violation of the Day in
Court Act); see also Action Nissan, Inc. v. Nissan North America, 454 F. Supp. 2d 108, 117
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (detailing a franchisee’s action against franchisor for violations of the Day
in Court Act); S. Res. No. 2073, 84th Cong. (1956) (describing the need for Congressional
action to protect dealers from the arbitrary abuses of manufacturers).
143. See Alfieri v. Willys Motors, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 627, 629-30 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (holding
that pleadings and affidavits put forth by a former automobile dealer against a manufacturer
under the Day in Court Act presented issues of the manufacturer failing to act in good faith);
see also Blenke Bros. Co v. Ford Motor Co., 217 F. Supp. 459, 463 (N.D. Ind. 1963) (holding
that a former automobile dealer’s action against a manufacturer, based on violations of the
Day in Court Act and other violations, presented genuine issues of material fact).
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relationship. In most states, it is unlawful for manufacturers to cancel or
refuse to renew a dealer’s franchise without good cause.144 This “good
cause” requirement is defined in each state’s dealership act.145 Depending
on the statute, good cause can be found for a variety of reasons, including
the dealer’s transferring of its ownership interest in the franchise without the
manufacturer’s consent, misrepresentations by the dealer in applying for the
144. E.L. Bowen & Co. v. American Motor Sales Corp., 153 F. Supp. 42, 45 (E.D. Va.
1957); Kuhl Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 71 N.W.2d 420, 426-27 (Wis. 1955); see, e.g.,
ALA. CODE § 8-20-2 (2018); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-112-102 (2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 126-101 (2018) (repealed by 2018 Colo. Legis. Serv. 187) (West); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4901
(2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-621 (2018); HAW. REV. STAT. § 437-1 (2018); 815 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 710/1.1 (2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 190.015 (2018); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:1251
(2018); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1182 (2018); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80E.01 (2018); MISS.
CODE. ANN. § 63-17-53 (2018); NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-1401.01 (2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
56:10-7.2 (2018); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 460 (2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-285
(2018); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 561 (2018); 49 PA. CODE § 19.1 (2018); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 13-14-101 (2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4084 (2018); WASH. REV. CODE § 46.70.005
(2018); W. VA. CODE § 17A-6A-1 (2018).
145. ALA. CODE § 8-20-5(a)-(c) (2018); ALASKA STAT. § 45.25.110(a)(1)(B), (c) (2018);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-4452(A), 28-4457(D)-(E), 28-4493(A)(10) (2018); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 4-72-204(a), (d) (2018); CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 3060(a)(2), 3061 (2018); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 12-6-120(1)(d) (2018); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-133f(a), 42-133v (a)-(b) (2018);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4906(a)(2), (b) (2018); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.641(3) (2018); GA.
CODE ANN. § 10-1-651(a)-(c) (2018); HAW. REV. STAT. § 437-28(a)(21)(C) (1993 & Supp.
2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 49-1614(1), (4) (2018); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 710/4(d)(6),
710/9(a), 710/12(d) (2018); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-2.7-1(7)-(8) (2018); IOWA CODE ANN. §§
322.3(5), 322.6(3), 322A.2, 322A.15 (2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-2414(b), (d), (e) (2018);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 190.040(1)(o), .045(1)(b), .045(2) (2018); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
32:1261(1)(d) (2018); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1174(3)(O)-(P), 1434(3)(N)-(P)
(2018); MD. CODE ANN., Transp. § 15-206.1, 15-209(a)(1), (b)(1), (c)(1) (2018); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 93B, §§ 5(a), 5(h), 5(j), 12 (2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.1567 (2018);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 80E.06, .07(1)(a) (2018); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 63-17-73(1)(d)(3), 6317-137 (2004); MO. REV. STAT. § 407.825(5) (2018); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 61-4-205(1), 614-207(1) (2018); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 60-1420(1)(a), 60-1433 (2004); NEV. REV. STAT. §§
482.36352(2)(a)(1), .36355, .36356 (2018); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 357-C:3(III)(c),
C:7(I)(c), C:7(II) (2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-5 (2018); N.M. STAT. §§ 57-16-5(F), 5716-8, 57-16-9 (2018); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 463(2)(d)(1) (2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 20-305(3), (6)(a) (2018); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4517.54(A), .54(D), .55(A), .59(A), .65
(2018); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 565.2(A)-(B) (2018); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 650.140(1)(2) (2018); 63 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 818.13(a) (2018); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 31-5-23(7), 315-35(3), 31-5.1-4(d)(1)-(3), (d)(6)(III) (2018); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 56-15-40(3)(c), 56-15-90
(2018); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 32-6B-45(1), 32-6B-46, 37-5-3 (2018); TENN. CODE ANN. §
55-17-114(c)(3) (2018); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. §§ 2301.453(a)(3), 455 (2018); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 13-14-301(1)(b) 13-14-305(1) (2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4089(a)-(b), 4092(c)
(2018); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46.2-1569(5), 46.2-1573(D), 46.2-1976(6), 46.2-1982(D) (2018);
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 46.70.180(14)(b), 46.96.030, 46.96.060 (2018); W. VA. CODE §§ 17A6A-4(1)(d), 17A-6A-(2), 17A-6A-5, 17A-6A-7(e) (2018); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 218.0116(1)(i)
(2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 31-16-109(a), (d), (f) (2018).
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franchise, the dealer’s becoming insolvent, and the dealer’s continued
engagement in unfair business practices despite the manufacturer’s warnings
not to do so.146 Good cause can also be found where a franchisee has
breached the material terms of the dealership agreement.147 In addition to
good cause, some dealership statutes also provide dealers with the right to
protest the termination of the franchise, allowing the dealer an automatic stay
without requiring the dealer to file for injunctive relief.148 In such cases, the
dealer will then have to make a prima facie case showing that the termination
was unlawful and, if the dealer meets this requirement, the burden of
persuasion will then switch to the manufacturer to show that the termination
was for good cause.149
State dealership statutes also govern other, more detailed aspects of the
manufacturer-dealer relationship. For example, in some states, in addition
to being able to prevent their own terminations, dealers can also block the
relocation or addition of another dealer within a certain mile radius of their
franchise.150 Similarly, some statutes govern the sale or transfer of the
146. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 3060(B) (2018).
147. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-651(b) (2018); see Robert W. Emerson, Franchise
Terminations: “Good Cause Decoded,” 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 103, 116-137 (2016)
(showing a statistical review of hundreds of court cases concerning franchise terminations and
interpreting “good cause” standards).
148. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.641(b)(7) (2018).
149. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.697 (2018).
150. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-20-4(3)(l) (2018); ALASKA STAT. § 45.25.180(b) (2018);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-4452(C), - 4453(B) (2018); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-112308(a)(23), -311(a) (2018); CAL. VEH. CODE § 3062(a)(1) (2018); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
42-133dd(a) (2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4915(a) (2018); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. R.
15C-7.004(6) (2018); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.642(1), (6) (2018); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
710/4(e)(8) (2018); IND. CODE ANN. § 9-23-3-24(d) (2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-2430(a)
(2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 190.047(6)(c) (2018); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:1257(B)(1)
(2018); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1174-A(1), 1435(1) (2018); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
93B, § 6(d) (2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.1576(3) (2018); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
80E.14(1) (2018); MISS. CODE ANN. § 63-17-116(3)-(4) (2018); MO. REV. STAT. §
407.817(3)-(4) (2018); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 357-C:9(I) (2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:1019 (2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-305(5) (2018); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4517.50(A)
(2018); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 578.1(A), (C) (2018); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 650.150(1)
(2018); 63 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 818.27(a)(1) (2018); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-5.1-4.2(a)
(2018); 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 8.105(a) (2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4098(a) (2018); VA.
CODE ANN. § 46.2-1569(4) (2018); W. VA. CODE § 17A-6A-12(2)-(3) (2018); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 218.0116(7)(a)(1) (2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 31-16-111(a) (2018); Robert W.
Emerson, Franchise Encroachment, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 191 (2010) (discussing territorial
exclusivity and abuses by franchisors, such as encroachment on another franchisee’s
territory); Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Territories: A Community Standard, 45 WAKE
FOREST LAW REV. 779 (2010) (explaining franchisor cannibalization due to territorial
encroachment); Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Contracts and Territoriality: A French
Comparison, 3 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 315 (2008) (comparing franchise law in France
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dealer’s franchise, despite express contractual terms within the dealership
agreement stating that the franchise is non-transferrable and solely between
the manufacturer and the dealer.151 Moreover, some dealership statutes
restrict the manufacturer’s right of first refusal that is included in the
dealership agreement.152 In most dealership agreements, a manufacturer has
a right of first refusal that allows it to step into the shoes of a willing buyer
in the event the dealer chooses to sell the franchise.153 Some courts in these
states have interpreted the right of first refusal provisions to be in direct
contravention of the transfer provisions of the state’s dealership act and, as
such, have found them to be void.154
With respect to warranty services, in most instances, the manufacturer
has specific repair and replacement obligations as warrantor of the
vehicles.155 Some state laws, however, require the manufacturer to use

and in the United States with a focus on territorial encroachment).
151. Richard L. Smith II, Franchise Regulation: An Economic Analysis of State
Restrictions on Automobile Distribution, 25 J.L. & ECON. 125, 139 (1982). Under a typical
dealership agreement, the manufacturer always retains the right to approve a potential sale of
a franchise. Walter F. Forehand & John W. Forehand, Motor Vehicle Dealers & Motor
Vehicle Manufacturers: Florida Reacts to Pressures in the Marketplace, 29 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1057, 1096 (2001). If the dealer chooses to sell the franchise, notice to the franchisor is
also required. McMillian, supra note 113, at 76. However, under some state dealership acts,
manufacturers are required to prove the sale, unless the manufacturer has a legitimate business
reason not to approve the potential buyer. Id. at 76-77.
152. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-20-4(3)(k) (2018); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-4459 (2018);
CAL. VEH. CODE § 11713.3(t) (2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 4910(c)-(d), 4914(a) (2018);
GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-663.1 (2018); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 49-1613(6) (2018); 815 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 710/7 (2018); IND. CODE ANN. § 9-23-3-22(c) (2018); IOWA CODE ANN. §
322A.12(2) (2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-2416(e) (2018); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:1267(B)
(2018); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1441, 1174(3)(I), 1177 (2018); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
93B, § 10(a) (2018); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80E.13(j) (2018); MISS. CODE ANN. § 63-17-109(1),
(2) (2018); MO. REV. STAT. § 407.825(7)(c) (2018); MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-4-141(1) (2018);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 482.36419 (2018); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 357-C:3(III)(n) (2018); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 56:10-13.6, -13.7 (2018); N.M. STAT. §§ 57-16-5(U), 57-16-8 (2018); N.Y.
VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 466(1) (2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-305(18) (2018); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 47, § 565(B) (2018); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 650.162(5) (2018); 63 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 818.16 (2018); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-5.1-7 2018); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-15-70 (2018);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 32-6B-84 (2018); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46.2-1569.1, 46.2-1977 (2018);
WASH. REV. CODE § 46.96.220 (2018); W. VA. CODE § 17A-6A-10(2)(q) (2018); WIS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 218.0114(9)(a)(4), (9)(d), 218.0116(1)(u) (2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 31-16-108(g)
(2018).
153. McMillian, supra note 113, at 78.
154. Bob Zimmerman Ford, Inc. v. Midwest Auto. I, L.L.C., 679 N.W.2d 606, 611 (Iowa
2004); Bayview Buick-GMC Truck, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 597 So. 2d 887, 890 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
155. McMillian, supra note 113, at 78.
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dealers to perform these services,156 which in itself serves as an additional
business advantage for potential franchisees to pursue an auto dealership
venture. Moreover, some legislatures also require manufacturers to
reimburse dealers, dollar for dollar, at whatever rates the dealers charge their
retail customers.157 These laws represent a shift from typical manufacturerdealer practices, where reimbursement obligations for warranty parts and
labor would typically be provided in, and governed by, the dealership
agreement.158
State dealership acts also address how manufacturers may allocate new
vehicles to dealers across the state.159 The purpose of these statutes is to
prevent manufacturers from forcing dealers into purchasing unwanted
vehicles and products while ensuring that manufacturers do not discriminate
between dealers in the allocation of more desirable vehicles and products.160
In these states, manufacturers utilize a predetermined formula for allocating
vehicles based on each dealer’s projected and actual sales.161
Lastly, state dealership acts, in some cases, also govern the forum in
which disputes between manufacturers and dealers may be heard and the
laws that may be applied.162 For example, many states require special
administrative boards and agencies to hear and oversee manufacturer-dealer
disputes as well as potential violations of the state’s dealership act.163 In
these instances, federal and state courts usually have concurrent jurisdiction
156. Id.; see also ALA. CODE § 8-20-4(3)(s)(2018) (illustrating Alabama’s requirement
that manufacturers use dealers to perform warranty services).
157. McMillian, supra note 113, at 80.
158. Id. at 79. For parts, manufacturers have historically paid a pre-determined mark-up
over the dealer cost for the parts. Id. For labor, manufacturers will typically reimburse
dealers. Id. at 80.
159. Id. at 82; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.64(18)–(19), (22) (2018).
160. McMillian, supra note 113, at 82. Of course, there could also be antitrust issues
associated with certain requirements. W. MICHAEL GARNER, FRANCHISE AND DISTRIBUTION
LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 11:1-11:9, 11:16-11:19 & 11:24 (2017) (discussing federal antitrust
laws as applied to dealerships and distributorships, including franchisor-imposed contractual
restraints).
161. McMillian, supra note 113, at 82. Manufacturers in Florida are required to go a step
further and provide each dealer with an “equitable supply” of new vehicles based on model,
mix, or colors. Id.; see e.g., FLA. STAT. § 320.64(18) (2018) (prohibiting Florida auto
manufacturers from unfairly or inequitably allocating products to dealers). The term
“equitable supply,” however, is not defined in the statute and raises additional questions,
including whether a dealer would be compared to only other Florida dealers when deciding
what constitutes an “equitable supply,” and whether the size of the dealer should be taken into
account when deciding what is “equitable” and what is not. McMillian, supra note 113, at
82-83.
162. McMillian, supra note 113, at 84; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.64(31) (2018).
163. McMillian, supra note 113, at 83.
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with these special administrative boards and agencies, allowing the party to
choose its forum.164 In the interest of fairness, these special administrative
boards and agencies are usually composed of both manufacturer and dealer
representatives.165 Similarly, some state dealership acts also regulate the law
that is applied in a manufacturer-dealer dispute.166 Such dealership acts
render the choice of law provisions in a dealership agreement (usually the
law of the home state of the manufacturer) illegal or unenforceable, making
the dealership act of that particular state applicable.167 Even where the choice
of law provisions of the dealership agreement are enforceable, the dealer in
the dispute will still fall under the auspices of the state dealership act,
allowing the dealer to, once again, override any choice of law provisions in
the dealership agreement.168
Clearly, state dealership acts not only protect the dealers, but also
indirectly promote the franchise dealer business model. The auto dealership
industry thus may have more appeal for potential franchisees in jurisdictions
where the legislatures offer broader and stronger protections for their
businesses, and thus greater avenues for the franchisees’ success. Still, a
common issue remains: how much voice may a franchisee have, and how
much should he or she have, in setting the terms of a franchise agreement?
Since it is the franchisor’s product, name, goodwill,169 and business model
that is being contracted for use by the franchisee, it should not be surprising
that the franchisor usually has most of the power (often, nearly all of the
power) when executing a dealership agreement, thus giving rise to the legal
and policy concerns accompanying contracts of adhesion.170 However, with
164. Forehand, supra note 151, at 1066.
165. Id.
166. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.25.020 (2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-6-122.5 (2018);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4917 (2018); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.64(31) (2018); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 10-1-624 (2018); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 49-1632 (2018); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:1269
(2018); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 93B, § 15(e) (2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.1573(h)
(2018); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 463(2)(t) (2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-308.2 (2018);
W. VA. CODE R. §§ 17A-6A-2, 17A-6A-18 (2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 31-16-124 (2018).
167. McMillian, supra note 113, at 84.
168. Id. at 84-85.
169. Franchise Goodwill, supra note 120 (discussing franchise network goodwill). The
creation, maintenance, control, and ownership of goodwill in the franchise context is an
ongoing issue. Clearly, in most instances the franchisor’s role, at least initially, in establishing
and maintaining franchise network goodwill is predominant. Id.
170. Terms of franchise agreements tend to strongly favor the franchisor. See Franchise
Contract Interpretation, supra note 118, at 688-701 (surveying 100 franchise agreements and
evaluating the relative frequencies of certain types of terms across agreements). A number of
courts have found franchise agreements to be, at least with respect to some characteristics,
adhesion contracts “because there is a disparity in the bargaining power of franchisors versus
franchisees.” GARNER, supra note 160, at § 8:38.
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recourse at the federal level and more rights via state dealership acts, the auto
dealer-franchisee ordinarily should have fewer such concerns than the
franchisees in most other industries. Furthermore, this could still be a
regulatory “plus” for the manufacturer-franchisor, too. While manufacturers
may feel constrained by the state dealership acts, certainly the stronger
protections and rights for dealers can draw a bigger pool of potential dealerfranchisees, with more franchise applicants, a possibly wider dispersal of
franchisee talent, and perhaps more competition for the manufacturer’s
business within the system’s own franchise network (intra-dealer bidding for
the franchisor’s favor). Of course, the complexities of managing franchise
relationships and operating under state dealership acts remains. Without
proper planning, dealers may prove unnecessary and expensive.
E. The Franchise Dealer System: An International Comparison
1. Japan
While American auto manufacturers simply tried to survive, Toyota,
with its superior automobiles and more efficient manufacturing processes,
thrived in all markets during the Financial Crisis, including the United
States.171 In 2008, Toyota replaced General Motors as the world’s largest
automobile manufacturer, giving Toyota a reason to oppose the bailout of its
two largest competitors.172 In that same year, Toyota brought in $17 billion
dollars in profit, while General Motors lost $31 billion and begged for much
needed bailout sustenance.173 With a seemingly superior understanding of
the market, and other aforesaid advantages as to cost of production and the
product itself, Toyota was able to capture customers that the Big Three had
failed to satisfy with their underperforming vehicles (poor quality, low resale
value, size needs, miles-per-gallon, or other standards of a shifting customer
demand).174
In Japan, dealers are significantly less independent than in the United
States.175 Dealers in Japan are much more limited in negotiating with

171. Michael Huemer, The True Costs of Government Bailouts, 11 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
335, 337 (2013).
172. Nick Bunkley, Toyota Ahead of G.M. in 2008 Sales, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2009), htt
p://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/22/business/22auto.html [https://perma.cc/Y82N-LGW5].
173. Huemer, supra note 171, at 337-38.
174. Id.; see Bunkley, supra note 172; see also supra notes 77-95 and accompanying text.
175. James B. Treece, Japan’s Franchise System Favors the Factories, AUTO. NEWS
(Sept. 25, 2006), http://www.autonews.com/article/20060925/SUB/60918045 [https://perma.
cc/P9F5-TY9E].
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manufacturers when they are unhappy.176 In 2004, for example, Mitsubishi
dealers allegedly supported an exposé criticizing the lavish lifestyle of a
Mitsubishi executive, in an attempt to combat new showroom and customer
satisfaction standards.177 Furthermore, dealers often sell only one brand and
are often wholly or partly manufacturer-owned.178 The Japanese Civil Code
includes a duty for parties to act in good faith, and an agreement can be
voided if it is too favorable to one party.179 However, these laws do not
appear to grant franchisees independence that would be comparable to that
of the United States.180 While this franchise structure has been criticized in
the past as giving too few options to franchisees, some manufacturers have
voiced opinions about adopting certain characteristics of Japanese dealer
networks, especially in the wake of the Financial Crisis, including going
smaller and having fewer franchise dealerships.181
The U.S. franchise dealer system has been historically characterized by
growth—the more franchises a franchisor can open up, the better.182 But
following the Financial Crisis, U.S. manufacturers looked to Japanese
manufacturers for ways to streamline operations and increase profitability.183
176. Id.
177. Id. The exposé apparently had no long-term impact in terms of shifting the auto
franchisor-franchisee balance of power in Japan. See id. (describing how the balance of power
still primarily benefits auto franchisors in Japan).
178. Id.
179. Kenichi Sadaka & Aoi Inoue, Franchise 2019 | Japan, INT’L COMP. LEGAL GUIDES
(Sep. 18, 2018), https://iclg.com/practice-areas/franchise-laws-and-regulations/japan [https://
perma.cc/SX4W-WRBE].
180. Id.
181. Weighing the Costs and Benefits of Car Dealership Franchising, NUWIRE INVESTOR
(Feb. 28, 2011) http://www.nuwireinvestor.com/weighing-the-costs-and-benefits-of-car-deal
ership-franchising/ [https://perma.cc/3NHD-2UPG].
182. Id.
183. Id. A similar trend was seen in the early 1980s when U.S. automobile manufacturers
began adopting Japan’s “Just-In-Time” system to streamline manufacturing and supply
processes. John Holusha, ‘Just-In-Time’ System Cuts Japan’s Auto Costs, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
25, 1983), http://www.nytimes.com/1983/03/25/business/just-in-time-system-cuts-japan-sauto-costs.html?pagewanted=all. In particular, under the Just-In-Time system, waste is cut
because parts are supplied only as and when the manufacturing process requires them. Justin-time, ECONOMIST (July 6, 2009), http://www.economist.com/node/13976392
[https://perma.cc/PPY8-8WNT]. This new system was improvement upon the existing “justin-case” system that held part inventories for every possible eventuality, which resulted in
wasted parts and the associated cost of wasted parts. Id. Currently, U.S. manufacturers have
greatly benefitted from utilizing their own versions of the “Just-In-Time” system and,
although not without its flaws, the cost savings of the system have been great for a variety of
U.S. companies. Steven Banker, The Costs of Excess Inventory can be Huge, FORBES (Mar.
10,
2016),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevebanker/2016/03/10/the-costs-of-excessinventory-can-be-huge/#7519b5df5a90.
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One major difference between Japanese and U.S. manufacturers is size.184
U.S. manufacturers have over 20,000 dealerships, while their Japanese
counterparts have eaten up market share with only a few hundred dealers.185
One reason for that may be the franchisor-favored laws in Japan, a stark
contrast from those seen in the United States.186 Boston Consulting Group,
Bain Consulting, and others recommend shrinking the number of U.S.
dealers to improve the overall health of the U.S. automobile market.187 How
much the market will improve is still uncertain. General Motors estimated
that it could save $1.1 million per closed dealership—Chrysler’s estimate
was a much more modest $45,500.188 The difference is attributable to the
companies’ conflicting views on volume of dealer incentives that they could
eliminate.189 While U.S. franchise law protects the interests of franchisees
and limits the circumstances in which the relationship can be terminated,
bankruptcy proceedings have complicated the issue, allowing Chrysler and
General Motors to terminate 1,454 and 789 franchisees, respectively,
through 2014.190
2. Europe
European automakers fared well during the Financial Crisis,
particularly BMW, Audi, and Mercedes.191 In the first 6 months of the
Financial Crisis, BMW sales rose 13 percent, Audi sales rose 20 percent, and
Mercedes sales rose 15 percent worldwide, painting the picture that luxury
cars were recession-proof.192 Interestingly, it was the higher end luxury
vehicles that excelled the most, with the cars at the bottom of the price scale
suffering.193 Another European automaker, Porsche, also had success
throughout the recession, hitting record numbers in 2012.194
184. NuWire Investor, supra note 181.
185. Id. The amount has declined slightly. See Auto Dealers in the U.S., STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/topics/3594/auto-dealers-in-the-us/ [https://perma.cc/RB5L-LTWX
] (last visited Nov. 26, 2018) (stating that there were a little over 18,250 new light vehicle
dealership outlets in 2017).
186. See supra notes 175-181 and accompanying text.
187. NuWire Investor, supra note 181.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Alex Taylor III, Record Sales for Recession-Proof Luxury Cars, FORTUNE (July 8,
2010, 4:32 PM), http://archive.fortune.com/2010/07/08/news/companies/luxury_cars_econ
omic_gloom.fortune/index.htm [https://perma.cc/NL7G-FQC3].
192. Id.
193. Id. Mercedes smart car sales dropped 17 percent. Id.
194. Scott Deveau, Appetite Grows for Luxury Auto Brands, FIN. POST (Oct. 5, 2012),

318

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 21:2

At least some of this success is attributable to European franchise law.
In the United Kingdom, for example, a manufacturer can decide to
restructure its dealership networks to eliminate underperforming or
undercapitalized dealerships.195 Therefore, while U.S. manufacturers had far
too many franchisees and were often prevented by law from terminating
these contracts when they proved unprofitable,196 European manufacturers
were not subject to such stringent regulations and were able to shed this dead
weight of unprofitability.197 In fact, European manufacturers are permitted
to cancel a dealership contract if the manufacturer is not satisfied with the
franchisee’s performance.198 Indeed, in France, while franchisees and
distributors have a right to all information that is of decisive importance for
their consent to enter a contract with a franchisor, manufacturer, or
supplier,199 the 2015 comprehensive reforms of French economic regulation
confirm that French distribution law, including automobile distribution, are
subject to the market, communications, and networking realities of a 21st
Century society.200 Similarly, in Germany, contract disputes between
German automobile manufacturers and their dealers have traditionally been
limited, with contractual terms drawn overwhelmingly in favor of the

http://business.financialpost.com/news/transportation/appetite-grows-for-luxury-auto-brands
[https://perma.cc/5ZNB-EUKS]. One reason for this trend could be that the clientele for
$100,000 cars tends to be less affected by the whims of the economy. Id.
195. Alysha Webb, Different Franchise System, Good Manufacturer Relations Help
Penske Auto Group’s European Sales Soar, AUTO. BUY SELL REP. (Aug. 12, 2015),
http://www.automotivebuysellreport.com/different-franchise-system-good-manufacturerrelations-help-penske-auto-groups-european-sales-soar/ [https://perma.cc/M4MJ-JSZJ].
196. See supra notes 68-168 and accompanying text.
197. Webb, supra note 195.
198. Id.
199. Didier Ferrier, The Impact of the Reform on Economic Law, 6 MONTESQUIEU L. REV.
1, 7-8 (2017).
200. Reforms enacted in 2015 and known as “the Macron Law” due to its chief proponent,
then French Economy Minister (and now French President, since May 2017) Emmanuel
Macron. Loi 2015-990 du 6 août 2015 pour la croissance, l’activité et l’égalité des chances
économiques [Law 2015-990 of August 6, 2015 for Growth, Activity, and Equal Economic
Opportunities], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE
OF FRANCE ], Aug. 7, 2015, p. 13537, art. 61. The actual effect of the Macron Law in all facets
of French automobile distribution law, such as for acquisition and transfer of know-how,
franchise renewals and terminations, competition law, and the bargaining for and
interpretation of the dealership agreement, are all still to be determined. LOUIS VOGEL &
JOSEPH VOGEL, DROIT DE LA DISTRIBUTION AUTOMOBILE 13-15 (2016).
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manufacturers. 201 The abolition of the Motor Vehicle Block Exemption,202 a
European Union regulation that exempted auto manufacturers and dealers
from compliance with very stringent European Union regulations related to
vertical restraints on competition,203 has further enabled German
manufacturers to include much more manufacturer-friendly terms in their
dealer agreements, including with respect to non-compete clauses, lessor
buy-back obligations, staff training, fit-out of showrooms, etc.204
Indeed, both Japanese and European auto manufacturers appear to be at
an advantage, whether through more efficient production processes,
favorable franchise laws, smaller dealership networks, or high-end consumer
tastes, when compared to that of pre-bailout U.S. auto manufacturers.
III. DETROIT: A CURRENT PERSPECTIVE
We now examine the benefits and costs of “bailing out” an industry
from an economic and policy perspective and whether the bailout actually
worked. The bailout, as many commentators argue, was necessary to prevent
the Financial Crisis from spiraling into an irreversible collapse of the U.S.
economy.205 The bailout, however, did not come without its costs.
Government intervention in any economy––while often necessary––
prevents market forces from allocating resources efficiently. The bailout, as
many argue, resulted in such a misallocation.
We cannot, however, go back in time. Speculating about what might
have happened had Congress refused to bail out the Big Three, while an
interesting exercise in economic and political theory, fails to remedy the

201. Christian Joerges, Relational Contract Theory in a Comparative Perspective:
Tension between Contract and Antitrust Law Principles in the Assessment of Contract
Relations between Automobile Manufacturers and their Dealers in Germany, 1985 WIS. L.
REV. 581, 581 (1985).
202. Susanne Hermsen, Current Situation of the Law Governing Authorised Dealers,
LEGAL KNOWLEDGE PORTAL (Jan. 27, 2015), https://legalknowledgeportal.com/2015/01/27/c
urrent-situation-of-the-law-governing-authorised-dealers/ [https://perma.cc/83WX-YB6U].
203. Albrecht von Graevenitz, A Guide to the 2010 Motor Vehicle Block Exemption,
CLIFFORD CHANCE (Oct. 21, 2013), available at https://www.cliffordchance.com/briefings/2
012/09/a_guide_to_the_2010motorvehicleblockexemption.html.
204. See Hermsen, supra note 202 (noting the manufacturer-friendly effect of European
Union regulation).
205. Chris Isidore, 3 Answers to the Auto Bailout Debate, CNN MONEY (Sep. 6, 2012)
http://money.cnn.com/2012/09/06/autos/auto-bailout/index.html [https://perma.cc/TMQ2-R
LJA] [hereinafter “3 Answers to the Auto Bailout Debate”]; Maria Shao, Steven Rattner: The
2009 U.S. Auto Bailout Was Necessary, STAN. GRADUATE SCH. OF BUS. (Mar. 1, 2011),
https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/steven-rattner-2009-us-auto-bailout-was-necessary
[https://perma.cc/KQ8X-HQFQ].
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problems of a distressed or, at least, vulnerable auto industry that still
remains today. The inefficiencies in governance, design, manufacturing, and
distribution must be addressed.
An analysis of more successful
organizations, such as BMW and Toyota, and the more favorable distribution
systems found in other jurisdictions, such as in Japan and Europe, provides
insight into how the traditional U.S. auto industry can streamline operations
for the 21st century.
A. The Bailout and its Costs
1. What Was It?
In November 2008, when the CEOs of the Big Three stepped off their
private company jets and onto Capitol Hill (with hats in hand, of course) to
ask the U.S. government for what would be billions to prevent the inevitable
bankruptcies of Chrysler and General Motors, it was said that they did so not
for their own sakes but for the good of the U.S. economy.206 At the time,
Congress and the media were outraged with the CEOs, their poor
stewardship of their companies, the likelihood that their companies would
not be able to pay back the U.S. government and, in particular, their obvious
lack of humility in choosing to fly private rather than coach.207 However,
reality would set in and economists warned that a failure to act on the part of
the U.S. government could—and would—lead to the loss of millions of jobs
and a meltdown of an important sector of the overall U.S. economy.208 The
U.S. government would eventually respond to the CEOs and provide their
companies the bailouts, totaling more than $80 billion.209 In return, Chrysler
and General Motors were able to avoid liquidation under Chapter 7 of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code and, instead, file under Chapter 11, allowing both
companies to restructure while continuing to do business.210 Also, in an

206. See Huemer, supra note 171, at 335 (depicting the scene where CEOs of the Big
Three head over to discuss potential bankruptcies of Chrysler and General Motors).
207. Id.
208. Id.; 3 Answers to the Auto Bailout Debate, supra note 205.
209. Huemer, supra note 171.
210. Id.; see also Chris Isidore, Bush Announces Auto Rescue, CNN MONEY (Dec. 19,
2008), http://money.cnn.com/2008/12/19/news/companies/auto_crisis/ [https://perma.cc/5P
HX-ULBU] (discussing the necessity of U.S. government intervention to prevent a
“disorderly bankruptcy” of General Motors and Chrysler); Zachary A. Goldfarb, Auto Bailout
Was Not Unmitigated Success, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2012) https://www.washingtonpost.
com/business/economy/auto-bailout-was-not-unmitigated-success/2012/09/06/4edae4bc-f85
4-11e1-8398-0327ab83ab91_story.html?utm_term=.4f7dbad4b430 [https://perma.cc/CJ4N3G4E] (discussing the devastating effects of allowing the U.S. auto industry to liquidate).
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unequivocal act intended to evince good faith (and, certainly, much better
public relations), the Big Three CEOs began attending congressional
meetings, ironically, by car rather than jet.211
The bailout of the U.S. auto industry was only the most recent in a long
line of bailouts and rescue attempts by the U.S. government stretching back
to the bailout of Penn Central Railroad in 1970.212 In 1980, the U.S.
government bailed out the most troubled member of the Big Three,
Chrysler,213 and, soon thereafter, bailed out a number of savings and loan
banks in 1989.214 Subsequently, in 2001, the U.S. government bailed out the
U.S. airline industry and then, once again, the U.S. financial sector in
2008.215 Accordingly, the response of the U.S. government to the U.S. auto
industry was not surprising. Questions are raised, however, on a broader
level, as to whether “bailing out” is the right strategy, at least in the long run.
2. The Hidden Costs of Bailouts and Other Governmental
Intervention
Proponents of “bailing out” will point to two different but
interdependent arguments for why bailing out is the right choice. First,
proponents will argue that a bailout is necessary to save American jobs.216
Jobs, so the argument goes, keep our economy strong and allow the United
States to keep pace and compete in an ever-changing global economy. 217
Before the bailout, for example, it was estimated that the U.S. auto industry
employed, both directly and indirectly, up to ten percent American
workers.218 Moreover, by the end of 2007, the Big Three alone employed
more than 240,000 employees with related U.S. vehicle and component
firms, directly employing an additional 730,000 hourly and salaried

211. Huemer, supra note 171.
212. Jesse Nankin & Krista Kjellman Schmidt, History of U.S. Gov’t Bailouts,
PROPUBLICA (Apr. 15, 2009), https://www.propublica.org/article/government-bailouts [https:
//perma.cc/X2R2-NDN3].
213. Gold, supra note 35.
214. Nankin & Kjellman, supra note 212.
215. Id.
216. See Huemer, supra note 171, at 336-36; Auto Bailout Saved 1.5 million U.S. Jobs Study, REUTERS (Dec. 9, 2013), https://www.reuters.com/article/autos-bailout-study/autobailout-saved-1-5-million-u-s-jobs-study-idUSL1N0JO0XU20131209
[https://perma.cc/BU87-A8TG] (noting the necessity of bailout for securing jobs in the United
States).
217. See Huemer, supra note 171, at 336-337 (noting the positive impacts of jobs on the
United States economy).
218. DUNNE ET AL., supra note 105.
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employees across the United States.219 That same year, 20,000 new vehicle
dealers in the United States employed more than one million people and had
sales totaling close to $700 billion.220 Therefore, at least on the surface, the
job numbers alone made it imperative for the U.S. government to act to help
ensure U.S. employment and economic stability.221
Second, bailout proponents will argue, in the alternative, that even if
saving jobs is not primary, the Big Three are simply “too big to fail.”222 From
this standpoint, the U.S. auto industry is considered much too connected to
the overall U.S. economy to simply no longer exist. As such, a failure of the
Big Three would bleed into other sectors and potentially cause an overall
economic shutdown of the United States.223 For example, pre-bailout, the Big
Three were the largest purchasers of American steel, aluminum, copper,
plastics, rubber, and computer chips.224 Moreover, General Motors alone
paid for the insurance of nearly one million Americans.225 The Big Three
also utilize and have interdependent relationships with a large number of
suppliers and original equipment manufacturers essential to the vehicle
production process.226 These proponents suggest that the ripple effect of a
failure of the U.S. auto industry would result in the loss of millions of jobs,
reducing personal income in the United States by more than $275 billion
with a government tax loss of $108 billion.227 Simply put, the lowering tide
would sink all boats.
Although these arguments have merit, the bailout provided only a shortterm solution to a failing U.S. auto industry, a solution which should prove,
at least in the long term, to be more consequential than effective. One reason
219. Id.
220. Id.; KIM HILL ET AL., CTR. FOR AUTO. RESEARCH, CONTRIBUTION OF THE AUTOMOTIVE
INDUSTRY TO THE ECONOMICS OF ALL FIFTY STATES AND THE UNITED STATES 1 (2015),
available at https://www.cargroup.org/publication/contribution-of-the-automotive-industryto-the-economies-of-all-fifty-states-and-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/UTC3-N8LZ].
221. DUNNE ET AL., supra note 105.
222. See Alexander Kaufman, Too Big to Fail: From Lehman to GM to Maybe Detroit,
Can the Bailouts Finally Stop, INT’L BUS. TIMES (July 27, 2013) (noting how the Big Three
firms are too important for the economy to let them fail); DUNNE ET AL., supra note 105
(emphasizing the importance of Big Three firms in the United States economy in addition to
the jobs they provide).
223. DUNNE ET AL., supra note 105.
224. Id.
225. Id. One reason for this may have been legacy costs. Discussed supra Part II. It is
estimated that the legacy costs of the Big Three, pre-bailout, added between $1,500 and
$2,000 to the cost of each vehicle produced—a cost not borne by their foreign competitors
who have fewer retirees and also, instead of private, employer-paid health insurance, have
national health care programs in their home countries. DUNNE ET AL., supra note 105218.
226. Id.
227. Id.
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for this potential outcome is that bailout strategies prove to be problematic
in the long run.
Government bailouts typically create a “moral hazard” in that a longestablished policy of bailing out private parties, business interests, or
industries can create an incentive for large corporations to take excessive
risks.228 On a similar note, large corporations may be incentivized to engage
in uncalculated risk taking. In business, the taking of risks can create the
possibility of even larger profits.229 Typically, corporations will take risks
where the expected losses do not far exceed the expected gains.230 Acting as
a kind of balancing force, the specter of going bankrupt for taking excessive
risks will constrain the risky actions of a large corporation.231 Uncalculated
risks, even if not excessive, can work to the detriment of a large corporation
on a smaller, shorter-term scale compared to ultimate bankruptcy, although
continued “minor” setbacks can equally lead businesses, both large and
small, into insolvency. However, when a large corporation knows that it can
avoid liquidation with an always readily available safety net of a government
bailout, the free fall as a result of excessive risk does not seem too far of a
distance.232 As such, the large corporation can enjoy the benefits and profits
of excessive or uncalculated risks without the corollary consequence of
closing its doors and selling off its assets.233
In these instances, it is not only the U.S. taxpayer or our policymakers
that bear the brunt of a government bailout; the stakeholders of the large
corporation, and the corporation, itself, also lose.234 As we saw with the
bankruptcies of Chrysler and General Motors, both companies were expected
to pay back every dime supplied by the U.S. government during the
bailout.235 The two companies eventually re-emerged heavily indebted to the
228. See Huemer, supra note 171, at 338; see also Brett McDonnell, Don’t Panic!
Defending Cowardly Interventions During and After a Financial Crisis, 116 PENN. ST. L.
REV. 1, 65 (2011) (describing the negative effect of government bailouts such as creating a
moral hazard for economic actors).
229. Huemer, supra note 171, at 338.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. See id. (noting the how government bailouts allow firms take risks that they would
not otherwise take); McDonnell, supra note 228, at 65 (depicting the trend for more aggressive
decision making when government bailout is an option).
233. See Huemer, supra note 171, at 338; Troy S. Brown, Legal Political Moral Hazard:
Does the Dodd-Frank Act End Too Big to Fail?, 3 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 1, 17 (2012)
(noting how large firms do not bear the real burden from taking uncalculated risks).
234. See Huemer, supra note 171, at 338 (noting how various actors bear the burden of
government bailouts).
235. Id.; see also Steve Contorno, Obama Says Automakers Have Paid Back All the Loans
It Got from His Admin ‘And More’, POLITIFACT (Jan. 22, 2015) http://www.politifact.com/

324

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 21:2

U.S. government.236 Furthermore, the shareholders of the two companies
lost some or all of their individual ownership stakes.237 Last, but not least,
the corporate officers and executives of the two companies lost their jobs.238
Thus, a government bailout does not fully protect those who lend money to,
work for, or invest in a large corporation.239
Second, contrary to inferences that may be drawn from the argument
above, the primary function of a business is not to provide jobs.240 The
primary purpose of a business is to produce valuable goods and services that
consumers want to buy.241 The more valuable the product, the more
consumers242 are willing to pay for it.243 Accordingly, the market price of a
product can often be a good measure of its value.244 As a corollary to this
idea, it is also true that the value of the resources used to produce the product
truth-o-meter/statements/2015/jan/22/barack-obama/obama-says-automakers-have-paidback-all-loans-it-/ [https://perma.cc/NH6P-L2NC] (finding that GM and Chrysler have paid
back the bulk of their loans but have not paid them back in entirety, as was trumpeted by the
Obama administration).
236. Huemer, supra note 171, at 338; Brent Snavely, Final Tally: Taxpayers Auto Bailout
Loss $9.3 Billion, USA TODAY (Dec. 30, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/
money/cars/2014/12/30/auto-bailout-tarp-gm-chrysler/21061251/ [https://perma.cc/58XB-J
N7S] [hereinafter “Final Tally: Taxpayers Auto Bailout Loss $9.3 Billion”].
237. Huemer, supra note 171, at 338; see also Rick Newman, Who Will Lose from the GM
Bankruptcy, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (May 19, 2009), https://money.usnews.
com/money/blogs/flowchart/2009/05/19/who-will-lose-the-most-from-a-gm-bankruptcy
[https://perma.cc/LAP5-HQK5] (noting the shareholder loss that was incurred from the reemergence of Chrysler and General Motors).
238. Huemer, supra note 171, at 338; Mike Allen & Josh Gerstein, GM CEO Resigns at
Obama’s Behest, POLITICO (Mar. 29, 2009), https://www.politico.com/story/2009/03/gm-ceoresigns-at-obamas-behest-020625 [https://perma.cc/79EH-4ZX5].
239. Huemer, supra note 171, at 338 (noting the lack of protection the government bailout
has on the actors who are affiliated with the firms); James Sherk & Todd Zywicki, Obama’s
United Auto Workers Bailout, WALL ST. J. (June 13, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB10001424052702303768104577462650268680454 [https://perma.cc/CBK2-GLE
S] (portraying the negative im-pact of government bailouts negative on lenders, investors and
workers). In comparison, during the AIG bailout, the counterparties in AIG’s derivative
contracts received 100 cents on every dollar of the more than $62 billion that AIG owed to
them. Brady Dennis, Fed Criticized for Not Negotiating Harder with AIG Creditors, WASH.
POST (Nov. 17, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/16/
AR2009111603419.html [https://perma.cc/9EFD-ZNLM].
240. See Huemer, supra note 171, at 339.
241. Id.
242. That is, a higher quantity both in terms of the overall number of market players
(consumers) and their individual offering prices.
243. Huemer, supra note 171, at 339; see generally Ralf Leszinski & Michael Marn,
Setting Value, Not Price, MCKINSEY QUARTERLY, (Feb. 1997), https://www.mckinsey.com/
business-functions/marketing-and-sales/our-insights/setting-value-not-price
[https://perma.cc/493A-LFBU].
244. Huemer, supra note 171, at 339.
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frequently dictate its market price.245 As such, this simple lesson in
economics makes one point clear: a business whose end product is less
valuable than the resources used to produce it is wasting valuable resources
that could be better used elsewhere.246 A primary example of this is a
company that is operating at a net financial loss because it is unable to sell
its product at a high enough price to cover it costs.247
In a free market, a company that is wasting resources, failing to produce
valuable products, and operating at a net loss will inevitably be faced with
two choices: change its business practices or go out of business.248 If it is the
latter, these companies will be pushed out of the market and the resources
they were consuming will be freed up for more efficient and profitable
companies to use.249 Thus, the market naturally corrects itself and places
limits on how much value a company can destroy.250
On the other hand, when a company is bailed out, this natural correction
mechanism is stymied.251 The government saves a business that would have
otherwise failed and enables the misallocation of valuable resources to
continue.252 Additionally, to effectuate a bailout, the government uses its
own valuable resources that could have been allocated elsewhere.253
Although these businesses become profitable, they tend to be less efficient,
245. DAVID RICARDO, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 5 (1817)
[hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION] (“The value of a commodity,
or the quantity of any other commodity for which it will exchange, depends on the relative
quantity of labour which is necessary for its production, and not on the greater or less
compensation which is paid for that labour.”).
246. Huemer, supra note 171, at 339. The theory of comparative advantage supports the
conclusion that resources should be allocated to the most efficient producers. See, e.g.,
PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION, supra note 245, at 81-82.
247. Huemer, supra note 171171, at 340; see also supra notes 43-96 and accompanying
text.
248. Huemer, supra note 171, at 340; PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION,
supra note 245, at 81-82.
249. Id.
250. Id.; see also Michael Shuman, Why Detroit is Not Too Big to Fail, TIME (Dec. 19,
2008), http://content.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1867847,00.html [https://perma.
cc/H6HQ-VH6V] (comparing the U.S. economic situation to that in South Korea, where the
Korean government refused to bail out the massive industrial conglomerate, Daewoo Group).
251. See DAVID RICARDO, Ricardo to Brown, in THE WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF
DAVID RICARDO: VOLUME VIII, LETTERS 1819 – JUNE 1821 100, 101 (Piero Sraffa ed. 1973)
(1819) (advocating for less government intervention so to not upset the “natural equilibrium”
of business).
252. Id. Often, the government is willing to give money while private lenders will not.
253. Id. In the case of the U.S. auto industry, the government allocated nearly $80 billion
to save the Big Three. See Final Tally: Taxpayers Auto Bailout Loss $9.3 Billion, supra note
236 (noting a taxpayer loss of $9.26 billion on the government’s automotive industry rescue
program).
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both before and after the bailout, than firms that never require a rescue from
the U.S. government.254 One reason may be that the firms still retain some
of the same characteristics that made them need a bailout in the first place
(i.e. an inferior product line, organized labor, disproportionate legacy costs,
etc.).255 Thus, while the bailed out businesses may not be destroying value
(or at least not as much), they still may be using their resources less
efficiently than other firms that would have replaced them if not for the
bailout.256
This misallocation of resources during a bailout can happen on two
levels. First, there tends to be an ineffective use of capital.257 When the U.S.
government rescues a business, it does so by lending money to the
business.258 The U.S. government will raise loan money for the business by
selling Treasury securities to corporate, individual, and foreign government
investors.259 Therefore, in the case of the U.S. auto industry bailout, if the
U.S. government had not raised $80 billion from Treasury securities and
allowed the Big Three to fail, it is likely that those same investors would
have invested in other markets, including other more efficient and more
profitable private sector businesses.260
Alternatively, labor can also be misallocated in the bailout context. If
a large corporation is inefficient and, as a result, poorly allocates its
resources, including labor, the company will likely consume more labor (or
‘provide more jobs’) than is necessary to produce its products.261 The
employees may therefore be happy while the large corporation and overall
market suffers,262 which means that the joy of these workers is, of course,
254. When was the last time Microsoft needed a bailout? How about Google? Nike?
Apple?
255. See Huemer, supra note 171, at 344 (noting the increased risk of repeat bailouts due
to retention of inadequate business characteristics); DUNNE ET AL., supra note 105 (noting an
expectation of further loans where corporate distress exists following a bailout loan); see also
supra notes 43-96 and accompanying text.
256. Huemer, supra note 171, at 340; see also MICHAEL L. MARLOW, THE MYTH OF THE
FAIR AND EFFICIENT GOVERNMENT: WHY THE GOVERNMENT YOU WANT IS NOT THE ONE YOU
GET 79-80 (2011) (criticizing the automotive industry bailout for lending taxpayer dollars
without fundamentally restructuring the businesses).
257. Huemer, supra note 171, at 340; Marlow, supra note 256, at 80.
258. Huemer, supra note 171, at 340; Marlow, supra note 256 at 80.
259. Huemer, supra note 171, at 341.
260. Id.; see also Shuman, supra note 250 (noting that, “The persistence of the belief that
Daewoo and the other giant Korean conglomerates were too big to fail led many bankers and
bond investors to toss billions at them no matter how loony their business plans or unprofitable
their projects. Money was wasted in unproductive ways.”).
261. Huemer, supra note 171, at 341.
262. See id. at 341-342 (noting that in cases of corporate inefficiency, employees should
be laid off so that they may have the opportunity to procure more productive employment).
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temporary. From the overall, societal outlook, a loss of jobs is sometimes
necessary to reallocate scarce labor resources to more profitable and efficient
businesses or perhaps to other industries.263 Thus, the notion that a
corporation is “too big to fail” may not always be true.264 In the case of the
U.S. auto industry, it was thought that if Chrysler and General Motors failed,
then so would their suppliers and, as a result, so would other manufacturers
that use their suppliers, leaving millions out of work.265 However, this
argument presumes that those millions would not have been able to find other
jobs and that those suppliers and manufacturers would not have just simply
downsized to keep their businesses operating.266 Moreover, bailing out large
corporations while allowing the free market to swallow up smaller
businesses, in the end, causes a greater concentration within one industry
and, as such, perpetuates “too big to fail.”267
B. A Postmortem on the Big Three: Did the Bailout Actually Work?
Post-bailout, the Big Three have been revitalized. In the time since the
bailout, the Big Three have made major moves towards higher quality
products and lower labor costs.268 As a result, they have closed the gap with

263. Id.
264. See id. at 342 (repudiating the notion of “too big to fail” within the context of the
automotive industry bailout); Marlow, supra note 256, at 78-79 (criticizing the bailout of
inefficient businesses under the guise of market protection).
265. Huemer, supra note 171, at 342.
266. See Marlow, supra note 256, at 80 (countering the assumption that businesses would
fail without bailouts); Huemer, supra note 171, at 342 (questioning the assumption that
automotive suppliers would have gone bankrupt without the bailout protections that were
imposed on manufacturers).
267. Huemer, supra note 171, at 344. It should be noted that even Congress takes issue
with this notion of “too big to fail.” See Cheryl D. Block, Measuring the True Cost of
Government Bailout, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 149, 153 (2010) (noting that the purpose of the
Dodd-Frank Act was to end “too big to fail”). In the preamble of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (more popularly known as the “Dodd-Frank Act”),
Congress announces that the purpose of the law is “[t]o promote the financial stability of the
United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end
‘too big to fail’, to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, [and] to protect
consumers from abusive financial services practices[.]” 12 U.S.C. § 5301, §§ 5481-5603
(2010). Indeed, the Dodd-Frank Act was a remarkable political and policy achievement that
provided new consumer protections as well as increased accountability and transparency for
Wall Street. Block, supra note 267 at 154; see Robert W. Emerson, Franchises in a Fringe
Banking World: Striking the Balance Between Entrepreneurial Autonomy and Consumer
Protection, 46 AKRON L. REV. 1, 11-12, 33-34 & 38-39 (2013) (discussing Dodd Frank Act
and impacts on some franchisee financing, generally).
268. Bennett, supra note 172.
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their foreign competitors.269 Since 2009, the number of manufacturing jobs
in the auto industry has increased 41 percent, increasing from 623,300 to
879,300 jobs.270 Moreover, the Big Three are regaining market share. In
2014, the Big Three had about 45.1 percent of the U.S. auto market, a near
two percent increase from 2009 numbers, but still below their pre-crisis
market share of 50.5 percent.271 Since 2009, the Big Three have also created
640,000 auto industry jobs to complement record sales for each of the
companies in both 2015 and 2016.272
One of the ways the companies have advanced the most is through
renegotiation of their labor contracts, a critical factor in not just their
economic well-being, but that of the nation as a whole. Taking into account
the significant amounts paid on legacy costs, with healthy bottom lines
across the board, the Big Three are responsible for three percent of the
American economy, are the largest source of manufacturing jobs, and are
With a move towards
one of the largest American exporters.273
manufacturing compact cars, $18 billion per year going to research and
development,274 and the recent recalls from Toyota,275 it is expected that the
Big Three will continue to grow.
On an individual level, each company is seeing varying success:
1. Chrysler
Emerging from bankruptcy, Chrysler has shown some signs of
profitability.276 Perhaps the most beleaguered of the Big Three prebankruptcy,277 Chrysler had pre-tax earnings of $8.7 billion in 2017, although
269. Id.
270. See Robert J. Samuelson, Celebrating the Auto Bailout’s Success, WASH. POST (Apr.
1,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/celebrating-the-auto-bailouts-suc
cess/2015/04/01/67f3f208-d881-11e4-8103-fa84725dbf9d_story.html
[https://perma.cc/UB46-MZVF] (noting the increase in automotive manufacturing jobs since
2009).
271. Id.
272. David Kiley, As Obama Takes Victory Lap over Auto Industry Rescue, Here Are the
Lessons of the Bailout, FORBES (Jan. 20, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/david
kiley5/2016/01/20/obamas-takes-victory-lap-over-auto-industry-rescue/#410d23b05497 [htt
ps://perma.cc/TA9V-S8EW].
273. Becca Smouse, Report: Detroit’s Big 3 Automakers Drive U.S. Economy, USA
TODAY (July 25, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2015/07/25/aapc-reportshow-increase-in-american-vehicle-sales/30649717/ [https://perma.cc/KN5T-KWEE].
274. Id.
275. Bennett, supra note 172.
276. Id.
277. Brent Snavely, Fiat Chrysler Returns to 101.2M Profit in Q1, USA TODAY (Apr. 29,
2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2015/04/29/fca-fiat-chrysler-first-quart
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sales were down nearly eight percent.278 In comparison, General Motors and
Ford earned $12.8 billion and $8.4 billion, respectively, in pre-tax profits in
2017.279 A closer look at Chrysler over the last few years, however, reveals
that the company has undergone many organizational changes to improve its
profitability. In January 2014, the company became a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Fiat Chrysler Automobiles (hereinafter, “FCA”) and
consolidated its various holding companies into one single entity the
following year.280 Without the tax gains from these 2014 and 2015
organizational changes, the company would have seen, for example, only
about $312 million in profits in the first quarter of 2015, down from $486
million in the same quarter of the previous year.281 Although the company
cited having to pay fines to the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration and various debt payments as the reason for the company’s
up and down financial woes, a historical review of the company’s profit
margins reveal much deeper issues.282
On a general level, profit margins indicate the percentage of a
company’s sales that it is able to retain after expenses.283 The profit margin
of a company indicates how well the company is doing compared to industry
competitors.284 Profit margins are especially important for automakers
because they affect the company’s stock price, borrowing power, and ability
to withstand an economic downturn that can quickly turn narrow profit
margins into multi-billion dollar losses.285 For Chrysler, the company earned
er-earnings/26539339/ [https://perma.cc/SLF4-WY3P].
278. Keith Liang, Fiat Chrysler Nearly Doubles Profit in 2017, DETROIT NEWS (Jan. 25,
2018), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/business/autos/chrysler/2018/01/25/fiat-chrysler-a
nnual-earnings/109794420/ [https://perma.cc/W9T8-9AAQ].
279. Ian Thibodeau, Ford Reports $7.6B in Profit in 2017, Up 65%, DETROIT NEWS (Jan.
24, 2018), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/business/autos/ford/2018/01/24/ford-annualearnings/109777880/ [https://perma.cc/HE65-AU9B]; Eric Lawrence, General Motors
Workers to Get $11,750 Profit-Share Checks, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Feb. 6, 2018),
https://www.freep.com/story/money/cars/general-motors/2018/02/06/general-motors-2017earnings-12-8-b/309855002/ [https://perma.cc/SWG4-6HPE].
280. Brent Snavely, FCA US Earns 1st Quarter Profit of $2.6 Billion, DETROIT FREE PRESS
(May 7, 2015), http://www.freep.com/story/money/business/2015/05/07/fca-fiat-chryslerfirst-quarter-earnings-north-america/70937282/ [https://perma.cc/TX9K-LC5P] [hereinafter
“FCA US Earns 1st Quarter Profit of $2.6 Billion”].
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Kimberly Amadeo,The Three Types of Profit Margin and What They Tell You, THE
BALANCE. (Dec. 6 2018), https://www.thebalance.com/profit-margin-types-calculation-3305
879.
284. See id. (discussing profit margin as a representation of company performance).
285. Brent Snavely, Fiat Chrysler CEO Aims for Profit Margins of Ford, GM, DETROIT
FREE PRESS (Oct. 26, 2016), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2016/10/26/fiat-
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a profit margin of 4.2 percent in 2014 while, that same year, its Big Three
competitors, General Motors and Ford, had eight percent and twelve percent
profit margins, respectively.286 Similarly, in 2015, Chrysler earned a profit
margin of 6.4 percent287 and 5.5 percent in 2016.288 In comparison, General
Motors earned profit margins of 7.1 percent in 2015289 and 8.6 percent in
2016290 while Ford saw profit margins of 10.2 percent in 2015291 and 9.7
percent in 2016.292 Chrysler’s historically low profit margins could be a
result of the company’s investment in new plants and vehicle development
in an effort to increase production and become more competitive, postbankruptcy.293 Since 2009, Chrysler has committed investments of more
than $9.6 billion to its U.S. manufacturing facilities and created 25,000 new
U.S. jobs.294 Despite these investments and new jobs, the company still
appears to be lagging behind its industry competitors in terms of
profitability.295 The company also saw declining sales for its sedans in North
chrysler-ceo-aims-profit-margins-ford-gm/92778652/ [https://perma.cc/3R8Y-Q7G9] [here
inafter “Fiat Chrysler CEO Aims for Profit Margins of Ford, GM”].
286. Brent Snavely, FCA Hints at Plan to Boost Profit Margins, DETROIT FREE PRESS
(Apr. 27, 2015), http://www.freep.com/story/money/business/2015/04/27/fca-fiat-chryslerautomobiles-earnings-profit-margin-mergers/26467753/ [https://perma.cc/S86L-KDRU].
287. Michael Wayland, FCA-UAW Members to Receive $4,000 in Profit Sharing,
DETROIT NEWS (Jan. 27, 2016), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/business/autos/chrysler/2
016/01/27/fca-uaw-profit-sharing/79405266/ [https://perma.cc/Q48D-Y5TV].
288. John Rosevear, Will Fiat Chrysler Automobiles Out-Earn Ford in 2018?, MOTLEY
FOOL (Feb. 25, 2018), https://www.fool.com/investing/2018/02/25/fiat-chrysler-automobilesq4-2017-earnings.aspx [https://perma.cc/L6T3-ZZT8].
289. Chris Isidore, GM Posts Biggest Profit Margin in 2017-Year History, CNN MONEY
(Feb. 3, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/02/03/investing/gm-profit/index.html [https://per
ma.cc/NS9H-632T].
290. John Rosevear, Tax Changes Mean a Loss for General Motors Despite Great Results,
MOTLEY FOOL (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.fool.com/investing/2018/02/06/tax-changes-me
an-a-loss-for-general-motors-despite.aspx [https://perma.cc/8ZTM-ND3E].
291. Michael Martinez, Ford Earns $7.4B in 2015, Posts Record Profit, DETROIT NEWS
(Jan. 28, 2016), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/business/autos/ford/2016/01/28/ford-earn
ings/79448532/ [https://perma.cc/8ZWC-8HJ9].
292. Bernie Woodall, Ford Sees Lower 2017 Profits, Takes Hit from Pensions, Mexico,
REUTERS (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ford-motor-results/ford-seeslower-2017-profits-takes-hit-from-pensions-mexico-idUSKBN15A1HP [https://perma.cc/9
Q66-YG4Y].
293. See Fiat Chrysler CEO Aims for Profit Margins of Ford, GM, supra note 285
(describing Fiat Chrysler’s multi-billion dollar plan to overhaul five assembly plants and
increase its pickup and SUV sales).
294. Paul A. Eisenstein, Trump, Detroit Automaker CEOs Trade Wish Lists, NBC NEWS
(Jan. 24, 2017), http://www.nbcnews.com/business/autos/trump-detroit-automaker-ceos-trad
e-wish-lists-n711466 [https://perma.cc/78KY-FH69] [hereinafter “Trump, Detroit Automaker
CEOs Trade Wish Lists”].
295. See FCA US Earns 1st Quarter Profit of $2.6 Billion, supra note 280 (stating that
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American markets in 2016.296
In an effort to increase its profit margins, the company has reduced
dealer discounts and is developing strategies to better manage its vehicle
production and product inventories.297 Additionally, the company closed two
sedan plants in the Midwest to convert them to plant facilities for light trucks
models, including the RAM 1500 pickup truck, which typically has a higher
profit margin than the company’s sedans.298 The company has also sought
to increase its market presence in Europe and in China, although the
company was a latecomer to China, the world’s largest automotive market.299
Despite rumors, however, that Chrysler was seeking to sell parts of its
company, including the Jeep brand, to Chinese automakers and investors, the
company has chosen to remain independent and partner with Chinese
automakers to deliver the Jeep brand to the Chinese market.300
As one solution to Chrysler’s profitability issues, the CEO of FCA,
Sergio Marchionne, and the chairman of FCA, John Elkann, have publicly
stated that there needs to be a consolidation of the U.S. auto industry to
increase profits as the costs of capital investment and the development of
new cars for global markets continue to rise across the industry.301 As of
February 2018, the top executives of both General Motors and Ford have
forcefully denied any possibility of a merger, acquisition, or deal with
Chrysler.302 Accordingly, it seems that even with the bailout and
accompanying bankruptcy, Chrysler continues to struggle to remain
profitable both domestically and worldwide. These issues do not seem likely
to change any time soon303 as Chrysler meanders down the road toward its
competitors Ford and General Motors earned higher profits than Chrysler).
296. Paul Eisenstein, Good News, Bad News as Fiat Chrysler, Ford Report 2016 Earnings,
NBC NEWS (Jan. 26, 2017), http://www.nbcnews.com/business/autos/good-news-bad-newsfiat-chrysler-ford-report-2016-earnings-n712561 [https://perma.cc/9GEJ-77R4] [hereinafter
“Good News, Bad News as Fiat Chrysler, Ford Report 2016 Earnings”].
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Alexandria Sage & Nick Carey, Fiat Chrysler CEO Says No Plans to Sell Brands to
Chinese, REUTERS (Jan 15. 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-autoshow-detroit-fca/fi
at-chrysler-ceo-says-no-plans-to-sell-brands-to-chinese-idUSKBN1F42IJ
[https://perma.cc/2HDY-WRK9].
301. See FCA Hints at Plan to Boost Profit Margins, supra note 286 (stating that
Marchionne and Elkann both advocated for further consolidation in the automotive industry
due to rising costs).
302. Id.
303. Some critics of Chrysler are more than skeptical about the company’s future
performance. According to Bernstein Researcher, Max Warburton: “[FCA] appears to be
fundamentally overvalued. It has very limited profitability, it is so loaded with debt it makes
little in the way of earnings, it is burning cash and it is not able to pay dividends.” FCA US
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third bailout.
2. General Motors
Although General Motors survived as a corporation through the bailout,
that did not mean that the company came out unscathed: The CEO was
replaced, thirteen of the company’s plants were shut down, and over 1,000
dealerships were closed as a result of the bankruptcy.304 Since then, General
Motors, at least from a profits perspective, appears to be doing exceptionally
well post-bailout. By 2011, General Motors was back in the game, reporting
a record net income of $9.19 billion in 2011305 and a total of $22.6 billion in
earnings as of 2014.306 In the fourth quarter of 2015, General Motors
reported the best profit margin the company has seen in its 107-year
history.307 During that quarter, the company earned a net income of $6.3
billion, or $3.92 per diluted share, up from a net income of $1.1 billion, or
$0.66 per diluted share, in the fourth quarter of 2014.308 Moreover, with $9.8
Earns 1st Quarter Profit of $2.6 Billion, supra note 280; see also Neil Winton, Fiat Chrysler
Headline Profits Look Good, But Bernstein Research Worries about Threat from Debt,
FORBES (Apr. 29, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/neilwinton/2015/04/29/fiat-chryslerheadline-profits-look-good-but-bernstein-research-worries-about-threat-from-debt/
[https://perma.cc/B2LY-59XD] (quoting Warburton who said: “[FCA’s] Q1 results really do
not inspire confidence. They reflect a U.S. business with pricing and profitability issues, a
historic over-dependence on Brazil and a marginal European business. They also reflect a
chronically leveraged company with a very unusual balance sheet – loads of cash and loads
of debt”).
304. See Paul Tharp, Obama ‘Fires” GM Boss, NEW YORK POST (Mar. 30, 2009),
https://nypost.com/2009/03/30/obama-fires-gm-boss/
[https://perma.cc/7NL6-SULK]
(discussing the replacement of the Chief Executive Officer of General Motors); David
Littman, What if Taxpayers Hadn’t Bailed Out General Motors and Chrysler?, BUS. MAG.
(Oct. 30, 2012), http://www.dbusiness.com/September-October-2012/What-if-TaxpayersHadnt-Bailed-Out-GM-and-Chrysler/#.XAXN3C2ZMWo/ [https://perma.cc/5R8Q-7XBK]
(discussing the closure of 13 General Motors plants); Ryan McCarthy, GM Dealerships
Closing, SEE THE LIST, INTERACTIVE MAP, HUFF. POST (June 4, 2019), https://www.huff
ingtonpost.com/2009/05/15/gm-dealerships-closing-se_n_204031.html/ [https://perma.cc/RS
33-7FA6] (setting forth the locations of all 1,000 dealerships General Motors dealerships to
be closed).
305. Alan Farnham, GM, Ford, Chrysler and Boeing Unions Score Big Bonuses and Lift
Economy, ABC NEWS (Feb. 20, 2012), https://abcnews.go.com/Business/gm-ford-chryslerboeing-unions-score-big-bonuses/story?id=15724619 [https://perma.cc/WD8R-NYA3].
306. Chris Isidore, GM Made $22.6 Billion. We Lost $10.6 Billion, CNN MONEY (May 29,
2014), http://money.cnn.com/2014/05/29/news/companies/gm-profit-bailout/ [https://perma.
cc/TXZ7-64YC] [hereinafter, “GM Made $22.6 Billion. We Lost $10.6 Billion”].
307. Chris Isidore, GM Posts Biggest Profit Margin in 107-year History, CNN MONEY
(Feb. 3, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/02/03/investing/gm-profit/ [https://perma.cc/3T3
2-MH2N] [hereinafter “GM Posts Biggest Profit Margin in 107-year History”].
308. General Motors, GM Reports Record Net Income of $9.7 Billion and Record EBIT-
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million in total car and truck sales, primarily in the United States and China,
General Motors boasted $9.7 billion in total net income in 2015, more than
tripling its 2014 results.309 2016 was no different when the company boasted
a net income of $9.4 billion.310 With banner years in 2015 and 2016, General
Motors placed sixth on the Fortune 500 list of U.S. companies.311 General
Motors’ post-bankruptcy success still remains in stark contrast with the $100
billion in losses it sustained in the four and a half years leading up to its 2009
bankruptcy filing.312 Although the U.S. Treasury Department and U.S.
taxpayers lost $10.6 billion dollars as a result of the bailout and did not see
a full “return” from General Motors on their investments,313 General Motors
is currently one of the forty most profitable companies in the United States,
coming in above companies such as Verizon and American Express.314
General Motors owes a great deal of its post-bailout profitability to a
variety of changes at the company level designed to ensure that General
Motors is poised and ready for the next nationwide recession.315 From a
financial perspective, by the end of 2015, General Motors had $20.3 billion
in cash on hand, $12.2 billion in available credit lines, and only $8.8 billion
Adjusted of $10.8 Billion for 2015, GENERAL MOTORS (Feb. 2, 2016), http://media.gm.com/m
edia/us/en/gm/news.detail.html/content/Pages/news/emergency_news/2016/0203-2015-4thqtr-earnings.html [https://perma.cc/4HR9-89SE].
309. GM Posts Biggest Profit Margin in 107-year History, supra note 307.
310. Michael Wayland, GM Expects 2018 Profit in Line with 2017; AV Investment
Increased, AUTO. NEWS (Jan. 16, 2018), http://www.autonews.com/article/20180116/OEM/
180119774/gm-2018-earnings-barra-autonomous-cars [https://perma.cc/53B8-UQHW].
311. Fortune 500, FORTUNE (2016), www.fortune.com/fortune500/. For comparison,
General Motors is more profitable than companies such as Verizon and American Express.
GM Made $22.6 Billion. We Lost $10.6 Billion, supra note 306.
312. GM Posts Biggest Profit Margin in 107-year History, supra note 307.
313. Id. The United States decided to buy General Motors stock instead of giving General
Motors a loan. Id. When the stock price never rose to the level which would allow the
Treasury to recoup its investment, the taxpayers lost out on that money. Id. By March 2014,
the treasury had sold all of its stock in General Motors and had written off its remaining $826
million investment, making its losses on the General Motors bailout total $11.2 billion. Eric
Beech, U.S. Government Says It Lost $11.2 billion on GM Bailout, REUTERS (Apr. 30, 2014),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-autos-gm-treasury-idUSBREA3T0MR20140430
[https://perma.cc/NJ85-7ZUE].
314. GM Posts Biggest Profit Margin in 107-year History, supra note 307.
315. See John Rosevear, How General Motors is Preparing for the Next Recession, FOOL,
http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2016/02/07/how-general-motors-is-preparing-forthe-next-reces.aspx [https://perma.cc/C9FK-59MD] [hereinafter “How General Motors is
Preparing for the Next Recession”] (stating that during an earnings presentation following the
fourth quarter of 2015, the Chief Financial Officer of General Motors, Chuck Stevens,
announced that the company was “very aware that downturns are difficult to predict” and
stated that General Motors is “planning and running the business accordingly, in essence
proactively managing the cycle.”).
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in long-term debt.316 Moreover, from a strategic standpoint, the company has
adopted a number of tactics to ensure its financial success for years to
come.317 First, the company has started focusing on cost-efficiency and
maximizing the company’s global scale.318 In support of this strategy, the
company set a goal to cut its annual costs by $5.5 billion by the end of
2018.319 Second, the company has chosen to implement effective “capital
deployment.”320 More specifically, the company has begun exiting markets
that are no longer providing the company with viable returns.321 For
example, the company has exited the troubled Russian market and
discontinued the low-profit sales of inexpensive small cars such as
Chevrolets in Europe.322 Third, the company has sought to reduce its variable
costs by producing fewer vehicles.323 For example, in 2015, General Motors
had 100,000 fewer vehicles in its inventory than it did in 2014.324
Additionally, General Motors stopped producing its less profitable brands of
Hummer, Pontiac, Saturn, and Saab to lower costs and the company’s
breakeven point--the number of industry sales required to cover the
company’s costs.325
In keeping with its long-term strategic plans, General Motors has sought
to diversify the company’s business portfolio.326 In particular, GM Financial,
Aftersales, OnStar, and global Cadillac are companies independent of the
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id. In the world of economics, the concept of “scale” or “economies of scale” refers
to factors that cause the average cost of production to fall as the volume of the production
increases. Economies of Scale, ECONOMIST (Oct. 28, 2008), http://www.economist.com/
node/12446567 [https://perma.cc/87W3-PWQC]. For example, it might cost $3,000 to
produce 100 copies of a magazine but only $4,000 to produce 1,000 copies of the same
magazine. Id. Hence, the average cost of production per newspaper has fallen from $30 to
$4 a copy because the main elements of producing the magazine (editorial and design) remain
constant and are unrelated to the number of magazines produced. Id. These are economies
of scale. Id.
319. How General Motors is Preparing for the Next Recession, supra note 315. In 2015,
General Motors and its subsidiaries had $147 billion in annual costs and expenses. GENERAL
MOTORS CO., 2015 ANNUAL REPORT 52 (2016), available at http://investor.gm.com/
node/16851/html [https://perma.cc/49AP-8MJZ].
320. How General Motors is Preparing for the Next Recession, supra note 315.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id. General Motors was able to keep its costs flat (equal to the revenue earned from
producing 10-11 million units), while it increased its post-recession sales to around 17 million
units. Thus, the focus to lower volume was less intended to lower fixed costs than to decrease
variable costs. Id.
324. Id.
325. Kiley, supra note 272.
326. How General Motors is Preparing for the Next Recession, supra note 315.
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automotive business cycle that will improve the mix and quality of profits
for the company, from peak-to-trough.327 GM Financial, for example, now
serves as a financing arm of the company, while OnStar is intended to
improve ongoing customer retention and generate additional revenue
streams by offering in-car services via 4G connectivity.328 Similarly, General
Motors has sought to make its luxury Cadillac brand a direct rival to the
German luxury-car giants.329
Finally, General Motors decided to invest $500 million in Uber’s main
competitor, Lyft.330 Together with Lyft, General Motors seeks to develop a
network of on-demand autonomous vehicles, with General Motors a
preferred partner for Lyft drivers.331 Those who do not own vehicles could
pick up General Motors vehicles from rental locations across the country and
earn money driving for Lyft.332 Moreover, General Motors, like Google,
Ford, Tesla, and Uber, is also exploring the world of self-driving vehicles as
a potential new market for innovation and investment.333
Unfortunately, General Motors’ unprecedented financial success has
not come without its own set of equally devastating pitfalls. On the criminal
side, in September 2015, General Motors paid $900 million to settle criminal
charges filed against the company related to its flawed ignition switch which
has been linked to at least 124 deaths334 and considered one of the deadliest
recalls in U.S. history.335 It was found that the ignition switch in some
General Motors’ vehicles would shut off the car while it was being operated,
disabling the airbag, power steering, and power brakes, and thereby putting
drivers, passengers, and others at risk.336 General Motors admitted that its
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Sara Ashley O’Brien, GM Invests 500 Million in Uber Rival Lyft, CNN MONEY (Jan.
5,
2016),
http://money.cnn.com/2016/01/04/technology/gm-invests-lyft-uber/?iid=EL
[https://perma.cc/DQP7-QU29]. However, it is rumored that GM will turn its attentions to
Uber instead. Alan Ohnsman, Honeymoon’s Over? GM Cruise Said to Turn to Uber As Lyft
Alliance Cools, FORBES (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/alanohnsman/2017/10
/18/honeymoons-over-gm-cruise-said-to-turn-to-uber-as-lyft-alliance-cools/#1daff5e13b15
[https://perma.cc/WHQ9-ZWYF].
331. O’Brien, supra note 330.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Chris Isidore & Evan Perez, GM CEO: ‘People Died in Our Cars’, CNN MONEY
(Sept. 17, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/09/17/news/companies/gm-recall-ignition-swi
tch/ [https://perma.cc/YMR5-E2FD].
335. Chris Isidore, Death Toll for GM Ignition Switch: 124, CNN MONEY (Dec. 10, 2015),
http://money.cnn.com/2015/12/10/news/companies/gm-recall-ignition-switch-death-toll/
[https://perma.cc/U2UF-EBD3] [hereinafter “Death Toll for GM Ignition Switch”].
336. Id.
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executives were aware of the ignition switch problem in February 2004,
nearly a decade before the company began its first recall.337 This delay is
what prompted the Justice Department to file criminal charges.338
On the civil side, General Motors is slated to pay more than $600
million into a general relief fund to assist victims injured or killed as well as
their families in connection with the faulty ignition switch.339 Luckily for
General Motors (and only General Motors), a judge ruled in April 2015 that
General Motors was shielded from liability for any claims arising before its
bankruptcy and reorganization in 2009, effectively disposing of more than
140 lawsuits and saving General Motors between $7 billion and $10 billion
in potential liability judgments.340 This ruling, however, did not absolve
General Motors of having to pay $35 million to settle civil fines levied
against it by federal regulators.341 In addition to the criminal and civil
337. GM Posts Biggest Profit Margin in 107-year History, supra note 307; see also Isidore
& Perez, supra note 334 (explaining the settlement, General Motors CEO, Mary Barra, told
employees “[p]eople were hurt and people died in our cars. That’s why we’re here today.”).
338. Isidore & Perez, supra note 334.
339. Id. This includes a relief fund that General Motors spokesperson, Jim Cain, described
as “fair, compassionate, generous and non-adversarial.” Death Toll for GM Ignition Switch,
supra note 335 The fund awarded those killed at least $1 million each, although some
received more based on the victim’s income and the number of dependents he or she had. Id.
340. See Victor Morton, GM Bankruptcy Worth Billions in Faulty Ignition Switch
Reprieve, WASH. TIMES, (Apr. 15, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/
apr/15/gm-bankruptcy-worth-billions-faulty-ignition-switc/ [https://perma.cc/V6R3-ZZCT]
(reporting that General Motors could not be sued for the deaths related to the company’s
defective ignition switches); see also Isidore & Perez, supra note 334 (reporting that no
General Motors executives were charged for the defective ignition switches). Under Chapter
11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, once the court confirms a bankruptcy or
reorganization plan, a debtor (here, General Motors) is discharged “from any debt that arose
before the date of such confirmation.” 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)(A) (2010). Similarly, after
court confirmation of a bankruptcy or reorganization plan, “the property dealt with by the plan
is free and clear of all claims and interests of creditors, equity security holders, and of general
partners in the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 1141(c) (2010). Moreover, creditor’s claims and any
pre-plan confirmation rights of creditors survive only to extent that they are accounted for in
the confirmed bankruptcy or reorganization plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(c) (2010). Unfortunately,
for the faulty ignition switch claimants and victims, their claims were not included (or known
to exist) when General Motors received its confirmed 2009 bankruptcy or reorganization plan
from the court. See Pamela C. Maloney, Top Story—Motor Vehicles—S.D.N.Y.: Ignition
Switch Defect Claimants Plan to Use MDL to Challenge New GM’s Bankruptcy Shield,
WOLTERS KLUWER PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW DAILY, 2015 WL 1950726 (C.C.H.) (May 1,
2015) (reporting that faulty ignition switch claimants intend to challenge in the multidistrict
litigation court the bankruptcy court’s ruling barring claims against post-bankruptcy General
Motors).
341. Isidore & Perez, supra note 334. In comparison, in 2014, Toyota agreed to pay $1.2
billion to settle a case related to its failure to recall cars despite reports of unintended
acceleration. Id. Similarly, in 2013, JPMorgan Chase agreed to pay a record $13 billion fine
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penalties, General Motors has recalled more than 30 million vehicles related
to the faulty ignition switch, with the company paying about $4.1 billion in
total repair costs.342
Union and employee costs also still plague General Motors. Taking
advantage of negotiating at a time of strong car sales and profits, the UAW
in 2015 agreed to a four-year contract with the company.343 Under the new
deal, veteran autoworkers received their first raise in almost a decade.344 The
deal also, over the course of eight years, closes a pay gap between veteran
workers and those hired since 2007 (who were paid at a significantly lower
pay scale).345 Additionally, the deal includes a signing bonus, profit sharing
plan, and other lump-sum payments that, over time, will add up to tens of
thousands of dollars in costs per worker to General Motors,346 a result similar
to that of the pre-bailout company that we all know so well. For General
Motors, only time will tell.
3. Ford
Ford, perhaps the only one of the Big Three not, at least arguably, to
receive bailout funds,347 appears to be doing well, although difficulties for
the company remain on the horizon. Since 2009 and the low point of the
recession, the company has steadily grown, as it has increased its U.S. sales
and has agreed, in its most recent labor contracts, to invest $19 billion in U.S.
plant facilities.348 Additionally, Ford has added 25,000 U.S. factory workers
since 2009, giving the company a total of 55,300 workers and the most U.S.
factory workers in the U.S. auto industry for the first time since the 1930s.349
Ford has also been in the political limelight. In April 2016, Ford
received flak from then presidential candidate, Donald Trump, when the
to settle criminal charges related to the sale of mortgage-backed securities sold ahead of the
Financial Crisis. Id. From this standpoint, it would seem that General Motors got off with a
multi-million-dollar slap on the wrist.
342. Id.
343. See Chris Isidore, UAW Approves GM Contract, CNN MONEY (Nov. 20, 2015),
http://money.cnn.com/2015/11/20/news/companies/gm-uaw-contract-approved/ [https://per
ma.cc/ZM5N-E8F9] (announcing that the UAW approved a new four-year contract with
General Motors).
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Muller, supra note 97.
348. Chris Isidore, Ford Plans Plant in Mexico with 2,800 Jobs, CNN MONEY (Apr. 5,
2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/04/05/news/companies/ford-mexico-plant/ [https://perma.
cc/D5QD-WE4V] [hereinafter “Ford Plans Plant in Mexico with 2,800 Jobs”].
349. Id.
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company announced plans to invest $1.6 billion to create a new small car
plant facility in Mexico that would create 2,800 Mexican jobs, a move Trump
called “an absolute disgrace.”350 The soon-to-be President then threatened,
once elected, to impose steep tariffs on all Ford cars imported from Mexico
to the United States.351 Ford, attracted to Mexico due to its lower wages and
favorable trade laws,352 responded to Trump’s attacks stating that “there
[was] not going to be any U.S. job effect as a result of this move” to
Mexico.353 Moreover, the company stated that in moving its small car
operations to Mexico, the company would improve the profitability of its
small cars because Mexican wages are less than half the top pay of U.S.
union workers who earn $29 an hour.354 Additionally, Ford CEO, Mark
Fields, defended the company, stating, “[w]e are absolutely proud of what
we do to contribute to economic development in our home country . . . . At
the same time, we’re a multinational company and it’s really important for
us to be competitive around the world.”355 Currently, some of Ford’s
competitors, including Toyota, Kia, and Audi, are each in the process of
opening major plant facilities in Mexico.356
From a strategy standpoint, Ford is also hoping to devote its U.S.
operations to truck and SUV lines, which have a higher price point that can
withstand U.S. wages and allow the vehicles to remain profitable.357 Ford’s
luxury trucks and SUVs are also in higher demand in the United States.358
While competitors are finding success in compact cars, Ford has been able
to manufacture the number one selling vehicle in the country: the Ford F-

350. Id.
351. Id. Trump also said, “[w]hen I am president, we will strongly enforce trade rules
against unfair foreign subsidies, and impose countervailing duties to prevent egregious
instances of outsourcing. This will continue until we can renegotiate NAFTA to create a fair
deal for American workers.” Id. Trump has warned that he will impose 35 percent tariffs on
automakers, both domestic and foreign, for imports from Mexico, Canada, and Germany to
force automakers to shift their production back to the United States. Trump, Detroit
Automaker CEOs Trade Wish Lists, supra note 294.
352. Bill Vlasic, Ford, Building a Plant in Mexico, Draws Fire from Trump, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/06/business/ford-building-a-plant-in-mex
ico-draws-fire-from-trump.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/U8NJ-HCLB] (announcing that Ford
Motor would build a new assembly plant for small cars in Mexico).
353. Ford Plans Plant in Mexico with 2,800 Jobs, supra note 348.
354. Vlasic, supra note 352.
355. Ford Plans Plant in Mexico with 2,800 Jobs, supra note 348. According to Fields,
“Eighty percent of [Ford’s] capital expenditures have been in the United States.” Vlasic,
supra note 352.
356. Vlasic, supra note 352.
357. Id.
358. Id.

2018]

BANKRUPTCIES AND BAILOUTS

339

series pickup trucks.359 Even though the trucks are the number one selling
vehicle, they have not hit their pre-Financial Crisis numbers (940,000 in
2004 compared to the roughly 600,000 they sold in 2012), which has caused
Ford to try to get consumers interested in their luxury car lines, such as
Lincoln, to make up for the lost revenues.360
Unfortunately, despite the economic wisdom and profitability that
would flow from a factory making smaller automobiles in Mexico and
increased output of larger, more expensive cars in the United States, Ford
scrapped plans for the Mexican plant facility in January 2017,361 just weeks
before Trump’s inauguration.362 In lieu of the plant facility in Mexico, the
company instead would invest $700 million to expand its existing plant in
Flat Rock, Michigan, creating 700 new U.S. jobs.363 Although some believed
that political pressure from the incoming Trump Administration might have
fueled Ford’s decision to scrap the plant facility, Fields denied such
allegations and assured the public that the company did not “cut a deal with
Trump” and that the decision was made for the betterment of the business.364
In making the decision, Fields said that the company was “encouraged by
the pro-growth policies President-elect Trump and the new Congress have
indicated they’ll pursue . . . [and that the company] believe[s] [that] these tax
and regulatory reforms are critically important to boost [the company’s] U.S.
359. Sam Frizell, Chrysler Enjoys Strongest Year Since Bailout, TIME MAG. (Jan. 29,
2014), http://business.time.com/2014/01/29/chrysler-enjoys-strongest-year-since-bailout/ [ht
tps://perma.cc/XNX4-QVJ2] (announcing that 2013 was Chrysler’s strongest year since its
bailout).
360. Id.; see also Vlasic, supra note 352 (reporting that U.S. automakers are shifting to
focus domestic production on high-profit vehicles).
361. Alexander Kaufman, Ford Scraps Plans for Mexico Plant, but Says It’s not Because
of Trump, HUFF. POST (Jan. 3, 2017), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ford-mexicoplant_us_586bcf32e4b0d9a5945c8b7b [https://perma.cc/9HFU-9ADJ] [hereinafter “Ford
Scraps Plans for Mexico Plant, but Says It’s Not Because of Trump”] (reporting that Ford
scrapped plans to open a factory in Mexico).
362. K. Rogers et al., Who Is Performing at Donald Trump’s Inauguration?, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/11/arts/music/donald-trump-inauguration
-performers.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/QXP5-FC4G] (announcing the performers for
President Trump’s inauguration).
363. Ford Scraps Plans for Mexico Plant, but Says It’s not Because of Trump, supra note
361.
364. Id. Ford’s rocky relationship with Trump is well-documented. While campaigning
in November 2016, Trump falsely announced on Twitter that he was successful in convincing
Bill Ford, chairman of Ford, to reverse the company’s plan to close a plant in Louisville,
Kentucky and open up the same operations in Mexico. See Arthur Delaney, Trump Falsely
Claims He Stopped Ford from Leaving Kentucky for Mexico, HUFF. POST (Jan. 3, 2017),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/donald-trump-ford_us_582e6846e4b099512f821df4
[https://perma.cc/JN37-AUHH] (reporting that Ford never said it would close its Kentucky
assembly plant). In reality, the company did not have any such plans to close the plant. Id.
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competitiveness.”365 Although wage costs will be significantly higher in the
United States than in Mexico, the company plans to make the capital
expenditures necessary to improve the overall efficiency of the existing
Michigan plant.366
Beyond the prospect of moving operations to foreign nations, Ford has
taken other measures to improve its competitiveness and diversify its
business for years to come. In March 2016, the company launched its
subsidiary, Ford Smart Mobility, to develop in-car connectivity, ridesharing, and autonomous technologies.367 According to Fields, “We’re
rethinking our entire business model. It’s no longer about how many
vehicles we can sell, it’s about what services we can provide. We understand
that the world has changed from a mindset of owning vehicles to one of
owning and sharing them.”368 As a part of this new initiative, the company
acquired a San Francisco-based crowdsourcing shuttle bus startup called
Chariot and partnered with the city to provide thousands of human-powered
bikes for a ride-sharing scheme. 369 Similarly, the company has embraced the
idea that driverless cars, Uber, and climate change will soon transform the
automobile landscape.370 One of Ford’s strategies to cope with this new
landscape is to invest in the development of fully autonomous vehicles.371
Currently, the company plans to have a fully self-driving car, without a
steering wheel, accelerator, or pedals, by 2021, although the company’s
production lags behind that of Google and other competitors in the
autonomous vehicle space.372
With regard to profits, Ford is doing somewhat well. In 2016, for
example, the company’s total revenue totaled $151.8 billion up 2.2 billion
365. Ford Scraps Plans for Mexico Plant, but Says It’s not Because of Trump, supra note
361.
366. Id.
367. See Mark Harris, Ford Tries to Catch Up to Uber and Google in the Driverless Car
Game, GUARDIAN (Sept. 12, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/sep/
12/ford-motors-self-driving-car-uber-google [https://perma.cc/R3SX-5NNU] (announcing
that Ford is working to develop in-car connectivity, ride-sharing and autonomous
technologies).
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id. Ford also announced that it was interested in partnering with Lyft. Ohnsman,
supra note 330.
371. Harris, supra note 367.
372. Id. 2018 has also seen the emergence of another company in the driverless-car scene.
See Neal E. Boudette, Waymo, a Google Spinoff, Ramps Up Its Driverless-Car Effort, N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
27,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/27/business/waymodriverless.html [https://perma.cc/5J8U-B456] (reporting that Waymo plans to buy up to
20,000 electric cars from Jaguar Land Rover as it strives to put its ride service into operation
within two years).
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from the year prior, with $96.2 billion of that earned in North American
markets.373 The company also reported pre-tax earnings of $10.4 billion,
which was $200 million higher than expected and signified the automaker’s
second-best earnings year since 2000.374 The downside, however, was that
Ford’s net income was only $4.6 billion, a 38 percent year-over-year
decline.375 According to the company, the significant loss of net income was
the result of a $3 billion loss related to revisions to its retirement and pension
plans, a number the company expects to be a one-time hit.376 Despite the
company’s relatively strong earnings, shares in the company still seem to be
trading in a narrow band in U.S. equity markets.377 Some commentators
believe that this low trade volume of the company’s stock may be an
indicator that smart money remains unconvinced that Ford would be able to
successfully navigate another recession without outside help.378 The
company also still owes the federal government $3.5 billion in connection
with loans it received to overhaul its factories an develop fuel-efficient
vehicles and technologies during the Financial Crisis which come due in
2022.379
IV. TESLA: A SUSTAINABLE ALTERNATIVE TO AUTOMOBILE
DEALERSHIP FRANCHISING
Although the Big Three have dramatically restructured their companies
373. Melissa Burden & Ian Thibodeau, Ford Projects Good Year Despite ‘16 Drop,
DETROIT NEWS (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/business/autos/ford/2017
/01/26/ford-earnings/97074568/ [https://perma.cc/3GVX-SUA6] (reporting that Ford
expected a strong 2017, despite a 38 percent drop in net income due to an accounting change
related to pension obligations).
374. Good News, Bad News as Fiat Chrysler, Ford Report 2016 Earnings, supra note 296.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. See Daniel Howes, Howes: Obama’s Auto Bailout Legacy Fraught with Choices,
DETROIT NEWS (Jan. 21, 2016), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/business/columnists/
daniel-howes/2016/01/20/howes-obama-auto-bailout-legacy-fraught-choices/79097442/
[https://perma.cc/9UCG-RXN5] (reporting that the U.S. Treasury recovered the vast majority
of its investments in GM and Chrysler).
378. Id.
379. Joann Muller, Trump Should Be Asking: Will Ford Pay Off Its Government Loan
Before Moving Small Car Production to Mexico?, FORBES (Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.
forbes.com/sites/joannmuller/2016/09/21/trump-should-be-asking-will-ford-pay-off-itsgovernment-loan-before-moving-small-cars-to-mexico/#aabe3625e37e [https://perma.cc/6D
BC-BK7G] (reporting on the status of the $5.9 billion taxpayer loan Ford received from the
U.S. Department of Energy in 2009); see also Muller, supra 97 note (reporting Ford’s receipt
of government loan to fund the overhaul of Ford’s factories and the innovation of fuel efficient
technologies).
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and fought hard to remain competitive, post-bailout, Ford, and especially
Chrysler, show signs of weak long-term sustainability. Additionally, the
record profits we have seen from General Motors, post-bailout, has only been
marred with billions of dollars in recalls, criminal penalties, and civil
lawsuits. With the franchise dealer system and legacy costs still prevalent
and, in effect, renewed, it seems only inevitable that the Big Three, or at least
some of the Big Three, will need another bailout to avoid a collapse during
the next significant recession or economic downturn—and, as we saw in
2009, if one or two go, the whole U.S. auto industry may go.
We propose an alternative to the inevitable. We propose that state laws
prohibiting direct sales from auto manufacturers to consumers be changed to
allow the Big Three to sell directly to consumers to remove the shackles of
the franchise dealer system and increase the overall profitability and
competitiveness of the Big Three in the global market. We think the famous
18th Century economist, Adam Smith, said it best:
[t]he natural effort of every individual to better his own
condition . . . is so powerful, that it is alone and without assistance,
not only capable of carrying on the society to wealth and
prosperity but of surmounting a hundred impertinent obstructions
with which the folly of human laws too often encumbers its
operations.380
We believe that the direct sales model of Tesla may be that alternative.
A. Tesla: The History, the Controversy and the Back and Forth
New and controversial to the automobile industry scene is Tesla
Motors, Inc. (“Tesla”), a U.S. corporation that combines automotive and
energy technology to manufacture Tesla electric vehicles.381 Martin
Eberhard and Marc Tarpenning founded Tesla in 2003.382 In its first few
years of life, the Tesla team expended large amounts of money to create a
production line for its electric sports cars.383 By the time the last quarter of
2007 came around, Tesla found itself in a financial crisis similar to that of
the Big Three during the same time period.384 However, Tesla would not
380. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 9 (1777).
381. To learn about Tesla’s business model and products, go to http://www.teslamotors.c
om.
382. Greg Kumparak, Matt Burns & Anna Escher, A Brief History of Tesla, TECH CRUNCH
(July 28, 2015), http://techcrunch.com/gallery/a-brief-history-of-tesla/ [https://perma.c
c/MKV9-JVME].
383. Id.
384. Id.; see also Cadie Thompson, The Christmas Miracle That Saved Tesla, TECH
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only be able to survive, but also to thrive after the Financial Crisis, unlike
the Big Three.385
Tesla was able to pull itself out of its financial hole through changes in
management. First, the company’s management laid off 10 percent of
Tesla’s employees to cut costs but thereafter obtained a new CEO who was
able to invest $70 million in the start-up.386 After creating the Tesla roadster
and family sedan models, Tesla accepted a $465 million loan from the U.S.
government and, in contrast to the Big Three, Tesla paid off this loan in full
in 2013, 9 years earlier than the maturity date.387 By going public on the
NASDAQ stock exchange in 2010, Tesla was the first American car
company to become publicly traded since Ford Motor Company in 1956.388
Despite Tesla’s success as a newcomer to the auto industry, the car
company faced some nearly insurmountable obstacles to its operations in the
United States. The obstacles may be deemed ironic, in that Tesla’s business
model actually adds a level of simplicity and transparency to the sales and
marketing aspects of the industry by removing the middleman: the franchise
dealer.389 That is, Tesla, as a manufacturer, directly sells its cars to
consumers itself, rather than using a third-party dealer such as the Big Three
and the majority of other domestic and foreign manufacturers. 390 This
innovative business model is accomplished through the establishment of

INSIDER (Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.techinsider.io/elon-musk-shares-the-miracle-that-saved
-tesla-2015-12 [https://perma.cc/9PWV-WWMY] (attributing Tesla’s survival to a $50
million investment from German automaker, Daimler, that closed on Christmas Eve 2008).
385. See generally, Matthew DeBord, Tesla is Entering Another Crisis, BUS. INSIDER
(Aug. 15, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/tesla-is-entering-another-crisis-2015-8 [ht
tps://perma.cc/YN34-76R7]; Tesla Overtakes GM as America’s Most Valuable Automaker,
FORTUNE (Apr. 11, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/04/10/tesla-gm-market-value-stock/ [http
s://perma.cc/DU46-4HYW]; Cadie Thompson, How Tesla Emerged from the Brink of
Bankruptcy to Become America’s Coolest Car Company, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 6, 2017), http://
www.businessinsider.com/most-important-moments-tesla-history-2017-2 [https://perma.cc/3
5JJ-EAXG].
386. Kumparak, Burns & Escher, supra note 382.
387. Id.
388. Id. Tesla’s initial public offering raised $226 million. Frank Athens, Electric Car
Tesla Launches IPO at $17 per Share, Beating Expectations, WASH. POST (June 29, 2010),
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/economy-watch/2010/06/electric_car_tesla_launches
_ip.html [https://perma.cc/G6EP-AEA9].
389. See Katie Fehrenbacher, 7 Reasons Why Tesla Insists on Selling Its Own Cars,
FORTUNE (Jan. 19, 2016) http://fortune.com/2016/01/19/why-tesla-sells-directly/ [https://per
ma.cc/E7NV-43LH] (reporting that Tesla’s strategy for selling directly allows consumers to
buy its cars without incurring a markup through a car dealer).
390. Cynthia Barmore, Tesla Unplugged: Automobile Franchise Laws and the Threat to
the Electric Vehicle Market, 18 VA. J.L. &. TECH. 185, 189 (2014).

344

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 21:2

manufacturer-owned dealerships instead.391 A customer simply goes to a
Tesla service center or online, uses Tesla’s online catalogue to pick her
vehicle and its features and, within months, Tesla delivers the vehicle to the
service center or the customer’s home or business.392 There is no franchise
dealership middleman required. While this business model may seem
harmless and, in fact, beneficial to consumers, in the United States, Tesla’s
business model has been challenged and met with outrage by automobile
dealers and dealership associations alike.393 Unfortunately for Tesla, these
challengers have legislation and legislative history on their side, which will
be explored below—although in a changing automotive legal arena, this may
not remain the case for long.
In most states, state franchise laws explicitly prohibit manufacturers
and producers from directly selling their vehicles to consumers at a physical
store in the state.394 In fact, in 2002, right before Tesla came onto the scene,
over forty states had this type of prohibitive law in place.395 For example,
Florida Statute § 320.645 provides: “[n]o licensee, distributor, manufacturer,
or agent of a manufacturer or distributor, or any parent, subsidiary, common
entity, or officer or representative of the licensee shall own or operate, either
directly or indirectly, a motor vehicle dealership in this state for the sale or
service of motor vehicles.”396 The text of the Florida law is fairly
representative of the broad textual language used by most state

391. See Nick Chambers, Tesla is Turning the Car Sales Model on Its Head, AUTOTRADER
(Nov. 2011), http://www.autotrader.com/car-news/tesla-is-turning-the-car-sales-model-onits-head-132587 [https://perma.cc/8Z7H-C27K] (analyzing how Tesla’s goals contrast from
the traditional dealer model).
392. See How Ordering Works, TESLA, https://www.tesla.com/support/how-orderingworks [https://perma.cc/J37Q-7K9B] (last visited Nov. 26, 2018) (describing Tesla’s ordering
operations).
393. See Get the Facts: The Value of the Dealer Franchise System, NAT’L. AUTO. DEALERS
ASSOC. (Oct. 19, 2015), https://www.nada.org/getthefacts/ [https://perma.cc/K47Y-XX57];
Fehrenbacher, supra note 389 (explaining the value of the franchise dealer system); see also
Brent Snavely, Auto Dealers Chief Warns of Tesla Direct Sales Model, USA TODAY (Oct. 6,
2016), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2016/10/06/auto-dealers-chief-warnsteslas-direct-sales-model/91649750/ [https://perma.cc/TZ42-XCL8] [hereinafter ”Auto
Dealers Chief Warns of Tesla Direct Sales Model”] (reporting on Tesla’s protectionist
litigation to enable it to sell cars directly to consumers in Michigan).
394. Ohnsman, supra note 330.
395. See Derek E. Empie, The Dormant Internet: Are State Regulations of Motor Vehicle
Sales by Manufacturers on the Information Superhighway Obstructing Interstate and Internet
Commerce?, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 827, 827 (2002) (explaining the roadblocks automobile
manufacturers face in the implementation of e-commerce due to state legislative restrictions
on certain Internet sales).
396. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.645 (2018).
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legislatures.397 The breadth of these laws makes it so Tesla can only sell
vehicles directly to consumers in those states through an indirect medium,
such as by phone or via the Internet, and thereby burden the consumer, who
will only be able to view and test drive a Tesla vehicle if he or she travels to
one of the few states that allow Tesla to establish physical stores or
galleries.398 These statutes do contain several exceptions to the “no direct
sales” rule, but none of the exceptions apply to a manufacturer, such as Tesla,
seeking to establish a permanent sales location.399
Cases arising under such laws that challenge Tesla’s ability to operate
within a state have been brought to courts and legislatures under several legal
theories.400 For example, in New York, a motor vehicle administrative board
issued a permit to Tesla, which would have allowed the manufacturer to
establish a manufacturer-owned dealership in New York, from which it
could sell its vehicles.401 Dealer interest groups brought suit under a local
law banning direct sales in New York, claiming that the permit issuance was
unlawful; however, the case was dismissed on standing grounds before the
merits of the case could be decided.402 Similarly, in Texas, Tesla initially
397. See Empie, supra note 395, at n.153 (listing the statutory language used in forty-two
states).
398. Barmore, supra note 390, at 192.
399. Id. at 194 (“Limited exceptions are allowed for temporary operations, grandfathered
sellers of used trucks or motor homes, and certain other narrow categories.”).
400. See, e.g., Tesla Motors Inc.’s Brief at 4, Tesla Motors Inc. v. N.J. Motor Vehicle
Comm’n, No. A-3213-13T2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 28, 2014) (challenging whether
a law that only restricts the ability of a franchisor to compete against its own franchisees also
applies to a manufacturer with no franchisees); H.B. 3351, 83d Leg. (Tex. 2013) (proposing
to allow electric vehicle companies to own their own dealerships in Texas and amend current
restriction on such companies as overly broad); S.B. 327, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 1 (proposing
to amend N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 20-286(11)(a) (2013) seeking to alter the definition of
“dealer” as used in the statute to include a person who engages in sales activities using a
computer or other communications facilities, hardware, or equipment at any location within
the state to prevent Tesla from selling its vehicles online in the state).
401. See Matthew Sturdevant, Tesla Clashes with Auto Dealers Over Direct-To-Driver
Sales in Connecticut, HARTFORD COURANT (Mar. 8, 2015), http://www.courant.com/business
/hc-tesla-connecticut-legislation-20150306-story.html
[https://perma.cc/SCW4-3R8X]
(discussing the legal issues that Tesla has faced in trying to sell directly to consumers in
Connecticut).
402. See Rob Schwartz, Tesla, Vertical Integration, and Incumbent Legal Disadvantages
in the New Car Retailing Market, 60 WAYNE L. REV. 567, 590 (2014) (discussing an action
brought by a private automobile dealer and dealer’s association against Tesla and New York’s
motor vehicle administrative board for issuing a license to Tesla to sell its cars through a
wholly-owned dealership). These cases have been dismissed for lack of standing in other
states as well. But see Amy Wilson, Tesla Reaches Deal to Keep 5 N.Y. Stores, AUTO. NEWS
(Mar. 28, 2014), http://www.autonews.com/article/20140328/RETAIL07/140329848/teslareaches-deal-to-keep-5-n.y.-stores [https://perma.cc/YY9V-62BD] (reporting that Tesla and
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sought a legislative carve-out to the state’s blanket prohibition on direct sales
from manufacturers to consumers for high-end electric vehicles only.403
Eventually, to enhance the likelihood of legislative approval, Tesla sought to
completely eliminate the prohibition altogether, allowing manufacturers to
sell vehicles of any weight, class, size or shape directly to consumers.404 In
its legislative proposals, Tesla faced fierce opposition in the state from the
Texas Automobile Dealers Association which argued that the state’s
prohibition prevents monopolies and promotes competition in vehicle
pricing and service to the consumer.405 The Texas Automobile Dealers
Association also cited state tax and employment benefits for the current
law.406 As a workaround during these legislative battles, Tesla opened
various service centers or “galleries” throughout the state where customers
could speak to Tesla employees, view the online catalogue, ask any
questions, and learn more about Tesla vehicles without the ability to actually
purchase the vehicle from the gallery.407 Each customer was then directed to
go online to purchase her vehicle and, when the vehicle was delivered to the
Texas customer, it would arrive with California registration.408
B. Public Policy, State Reactions, and Legislative Proposals
The public policy behind the above laws is to prevent manufacturers
from competing with their own dealers—otherwise, manufacturers would
take advantage of the information asymmetry and create more productive
sales locations for themselves.409 As Tesla’s business model allows for
manufacturer car sales only, there is no likelihood of dealer harm as
anticipated when other manufacturers self-sell their own vehicles.410
New York auto dealer lobbying groups reached an agreement to allow Tesla to keep its five
company-owned stores in the state).
403. See Patrick Svitek, Tesla Tries a New, Ambitious Approach at Texas Capitol, TEX.
TRIBUNE (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.texastribune.org/2017/03/10/tesla-tries-new-approac
h-texas-capitol/ [https://perma.cc/TY3G-3NBR] (describing a legislative proposal brought
forth in Texas that would allow any vehicle manufacturer to sell directly to Texas residents).
404. Id.
405. See Jeff Mosier, Why Texas’ $2,500 Electric Car Incentive Won’t Apply If You Buy
a Tesla, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (June 11, 2018), https://www.dallasnews.com/business/aut
os/2018/06/11/texas-2500-electric-car-incentive-wont-apply-popular-brand [https://perma.cc
/JG82-B6NZ] (explaining that Tesla is not eligible for a $2,500 new alternative-fuel incentive
because its cars are not actually sold in the state).
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Empie, supra note 395, at 851.
410. Id. at 851; see generally Barmore, supra note 390.
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Application of these laws to Tesla is misplaced, but also raises bigger
concerns. When state law does not allow Tesla to establish a manufacturerowned store within a state, the state legislatures are indirectly attempting to
influence and force Tesla to adopt a manufacturer-dealer-consumer model
for its business.411 This approach creates a state influence over corporate
operations and the free flow of commerce that scholars and opponents have
begun to criticize as anti-consumer and anti-competitive.412 There are
concerns that state politicians are attempting to control the marketplace and
prevent interstate commerce.413
How has this opposition impacted the legislative landscape? Thus far,
the greatest efforts Tesla and its supporters have taken are geared towards
lobbying state legislatures. The lobbyists have achieved mixed results
throughout the states, with some legislatures even allowing existing Tesla
stores to remain in operation as long as Tesla does not expand the number of
business locations it has in the state.414 This minor victory will not assist
Tesla in expanding the corporation in the future but will allow Tesla to keep
its shop doors open in the near term until further reform can be accomplished.
As a greater victory, Tesla successfully fought New Jersey legal reform
aimed at shutting down Tesla company stores in the state.415 The New Jersey
Motor Vehicle Commission amended state law such that any party seeking
a dealership license in the state was required to “produce evidence that the
applicant or licensee is a franchisee” in order to obtain a license—something
that Tesla would not be able to produce.416 In response, the New Jersey State
Assembly’s Consumer Affairs Committee sponsored and unanimously
enacted a new bill that reversed the Motor Vehicle Commission’s decision

411. Empie, supra note 395, at 851; see also Macy Cotton, Electric Avenue: How Texas
Should Reform the Way Cars Are Sold and Allow Tesla to Sell Directly to Consumers, 16 TEX.
TECH. ADMIN. L.J. 419, 439-440 (2015) (discussing the uphill battle that Tesla has faced
against the Texas Automobile Dealers Association).
412. Empie, supra note 395, at 853.
413. Id.
414. Pennsylvania, Ohio, and New York have created such exemptions for existing Tesla
locations. See Schwartz, supra note 402, at 594.
415. See Brian Fung, Tesla Won a Huge Victory in New Jersey, WASH. POST (Mar. 18,
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/03/18/tesla-just-won-ahuge-victory-in-new-jersey/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.9e71163dd5e8 (reporting that Tesla
can sell vehicles from company-owned dealerships in New Jersey after Governor Chris
Christie signed a bill that allows for up to four locations).
416. See Eric D. Stolze, A Billion Dollar Franchise Fee? Tesla Motors’ Battle for Direct
Sales: State Dealer Franchise Law and Politics, 34 FRANCHISE L.J. 293, 298 (2015)
(discussing the challenges that Tesla faced in adapting a direct-to-consumer sales model to
outdated automobile dealer franchise regimes).
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and allowed Tesla to sell vehicles directly to consumers in New Jersey.417 It
did so by specifically protecting “motor vehicle franchisor[s] licensed . . . on
or prior to January 1, 2014 and exclusively manufacturing zero emission
vehicles.”418
Tesla has faced similar battles in other states. Recently, Connecticut’s
Department of Motor Vehicles ruled that Tesla was selling cars out of its
Greenwich “gallery” without a new car dealer’s license in violation of state
law.419 The company immediately appealed the ruling citing that the ruling
was an “unfortunate circumstance for Connecticut consumers.”420
According to the company, the State of Connecticut loses $5 million in tax
revenue per year from consumers who simply go to New York to buy Tesla
automobiles.421 This pro-consumer and pro-state argument was successful
for the company in New York, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island which
recently approved Tesla’s direct to consumer marketing system.422
Similarly, in Utah, the company sought to operate in the state under the
state’s current dealership law and built a $3 million store in Salt Lake City
in 2015, but the full-fledged store was demoted to a gallery 2 weeks before
opening due to the Utah Attorney General’s office ruling that the gallery was
against the state’s direct consumer sales law.423 Since the ruling, the
company obtained a used car dealer license and has sued the state for the
right to sell in Utah. The company, however, lost its direct sales lawsuit in

417. Id.
418. Id.
419. See Gregory B. Hladsky, Legislative Battles Renewed Over Tesla Car Sales,
HARTFORD COURANT (Mar. 5, 2018), http://www.courant.com/politics/hc-pol-tesla-vscardealers-battles-renewed-20180305-story.html [https://perma.cc/G6BC-43UD] (reporting
on the long-running legislative battle over allowing Tesla to sell its cars directly to
consumers).
420. Id. For the fourth year in a row, a bill allowing Tesla to bring its direct-to-consumer
business model to Connecticut cleared a General Assembly committee only to be stalled at
the legislative level because Tesla has been unable to reach some middle ground with dealers,
who have insisted the company abide by existing franchise rules that require sales through
dealerships. See also Benjamin Kail, Tesla, Dealers Remain at Odds as Lawmakers Urge
(Mar.
25,
2018)
https://www.theday.com/
Compromise,
DAY PUB. CO.
article/20180324/NWS12/180329607 [https://perma.cc/VVW6-SXQA] (discussing the
necessity for car dealers and Tesla to find middle group in order to pass legislation on car
sales).
421. Hladsky, supra note 419.
422. Id.
423. See Fred Lambert, Tesla Takes a Win for Direct Sales in Utah, Bill to Allow
Operating Its Own Stores Goes to the Governor, ELECTREK (Mar. 9, 2018), https://electrek.
co/2018/03/09/tesla-direct-sales-win-utah-bill/ [https://perma.cc/7HS8-45VP] (reporting on
the status of H.B. 369, which would allow Tesla to sell its cars directly to consumers in Utah).
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the Utah Supreme Court in 2017.424 After going through the court system,
the company tried again to get approval for direct sales through the Utah
legislature, which recently approved a bill to allow Tesla to conduct direct
sales to consumers in the state.425
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) expressed its disdain for the
“no direct sales” laws on its blog, stating: “states should allow consumers to
choose not only the cars they buy, but also how they buy them.”426 The FTC
took this position to allow Tesla to directly sell its vehicles to consumers, but
also for any company that chooses to use this business model to distribute
products.427 The FTC described how the marketplace itself is able to police
inefficient or unsupported distribution practices, such that the government
should not intervene unless extreme circumstances warrant intervention.428
Currently, the embattled Tesla and its business model are slowly but
surely winding their way through both courts and legislatures. Although the
legal battles and legislative proposals are not yet settled, the company seems
to be injecting a new perspective as to how cars can be sold in the United
States as lawmakers begin to recognize that the advent of the Internet has
made the old, dealer-only system of car sales antiquated.429 To have longterm success, Tesla will need to continue its legal efforts and also rectify its
recent and very public issues on a company level as it seeks to control its
Twitter-happy, brash, and temperamental CEO, Elon Musk, withstand SEC
fraud investigations, decide whether or not to stay public, and maintain
investor confidence as it blows production deadline after production deadline
for its much-anticipated and affordable Model 3.430 Nevertheless, Tesla’s
business model and the legal reform it seeks may be just what the Big Three
need for success in the long run.
424. See Tesla Motors UT, Inc. v. Utah Tax Commission, 398 P.3d 55 (Utah 2017)
(holding that the Franchise Act’s bar on the franchisor owner interest in a new motor vehicle
dealer did not violate the applicant’s equal protection rights).
425. Lambert, supra note 423.
426. See Marina Lao, Debbie Feinstein, & Francine Lafontaine, Direct-to-Consumer Auto
Sales: It’s Not Just About Tesla, FTC: COMPETITION MATTERS (May 11, 2015, 11:00 A.M.),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/competition-matters/2015/05/direct-consumer-autosales-its-not-just-about-tesla [https://perma.cc/89CE-W8HA] (arguing that consumers will
benefit from direct-to-consumer auto sales based on the fundamental principle of
competition).
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. See Mark Matousek, Tesla is Experiencing a Painful Year—Here’s Everything that
has Gone Wrong So Far, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/tes
la-challenges-in-2018-2018-4 [https://perma.cc/K4BE-LDB8] (discussing the business
challengers that Tesla has faced in 2018).
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V. THE SUSTAINABILITY OF AUTO DEALERSHIPS: BAILOUTS, DIRECT
SALES, AND “MIDDLEMEN”
With innovative technologies and methodologies similar to Tesla
coming onto the scene, one cannot help but wonder what the future holds for
the U.S. auto industry and, in particular, the Big Three. Those involved in
the industry and the public alike have begun to question whether the system
itself can continue to function as it is and, if it does, whether dealers will
continue to play their role. The manufacturer-dealer relationship has a
longstanding history of rarely being seriously questioned in the United
States, as all players involved have always accepted it as a way of life. Now,
Tesla has introduced a simpler sales process, which appeals to both
automobile manufacturers and consumers alike (assuming that
manufacturers can restructure to account for all costs related to taking on
their own distribution). This simpler sales process has also eliminated the
saturated, costly, labor-heavy, and overly expanded dealer networks that
heavily bogged down the Big Three before and during the Financial Crisis
and continues to do so now.
If the outcome of the Financial Crisis is any indication of things to
come, the U.S. auto industry has been functioning in a financially volatile
and risky way for too long. The bailout the Big Three received did not
change this fact, as most, if not all, automobile dealerships are still highly
leveraged against the vehicles they are selling to consumers. As an even
more pressing concern, the reasons for why a bailout was necessary in the
first place, such as overly-expanded dealer networks, legacy costs, and less
desirable products, are still present in the U.S. auto industry. The American
cars being produced today are not more valuable or appealing as a product
to American consumers than they were before the bailout—the ultimate
reason why a bailout was required in the first place.431 If anything, the
public’s perception of American manufacturers has been further diminished
by the safety scandals and failures of General Motors in recent years.432
Without increased support from the American public, the U.S. auto industry
will ultimately fail, need an additional bailout, be forced to adopt new
business models and practices, or some combination of all three options.
Thus, it appears that two main subjects will be at the forefront of the
431. See David Kiley, As Obama Takes Victory Lap Over Auto Industry Rescue, Here Are
The Lessons Of The Bailout, FORBES (Jan. 20, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidkile
y5/2016/01/20/obamas-takes-victory-lap-over-auto-industry-rescue/#355b73a03e83
(reporting that the bailouts of GM and Chrysler have done little to change the fundamental
dynamics of the automobile industry that have caused it grief for decades).
432. Id.; see supra notes 334-342 and accompanying text.
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U.S. auto industry in the upcoming years: (1) whether the bailout was,
indeed, a temporary fix of manufacturer problems and (2) whether the directsales model and challenges brought by Tesla and similar companies will be
a much more sustainable business model for the U.S. auto industry in the
long run.433
From the franchisor manufacturer’s perspective, the majority of
franchise laws enacted in the United States over the past decades have
become more and more dealer-friendly; for example, the Day in Court Act
and state laws prohibiting non-franchisees from dealing in vehicles are
oriented towards the interests of dealers.434 In fact, the Alliance of
Automobile Manufacturers has begun to recognize this shift in power and
the need to maintain open-mindedness about how “best to serve new-car
buyers in the future.”435 This need to be open-minded is perhaps influenced
by the feeling that the original justifications for creating and maintaining a
manufacturer-dealer-consumer model no longer apply. As Philip Delves
Broughton of The New Yorker describes this transition, “[c]onsumers can
go online and find the specs of any car they might want. They can apply for
credit online. They can sell their old cars on eBay or Craigslist. They can
get cheaper parts and service at a local mechanic . . . [t]he dealer has become
superfluous.”436 For the manufacturer, this means that a dealership is no
longer the only viable resource for reaching consumers and performing the
tasks that dealerships were traditionally needed to perform.
From the perspective of the consumer, a direct sale from the
manufacturer can be quicker and more cost effective than purchasing a
vehicle from a dealership—most American consumers would likely agree
433. Lao, Feinstein & Lafontaine, supra note 426. Another company that uses the directsales model is Elio Motors, which had 41,000 reservations for vehicles to be bought directly
from their manufacturing facilities in March 2015. Id. (In expressing its dislike of state
restrictions that prohibit companies like Tesla from directly selling to consumers, the FTC
said, “[a] fundamental principle of competition is that consumers – not regulation – should
determine what they buy and how they buy it. Consumers may benefit from the ability to buy
cars directly from manufacturers – whether they are shopping for luxury cars or economy
vehicles. The same competition principles should apply in either case.”) Id.
434. See Amy Wilson, State Franchise Laws, Sparked by Tesla, Go Too Far, Other
Automakers Charge, AUTO. NEWS (June 16, 2014), http://www.autonews.com/article/2014
0616/RETAIL07/306169943/state-franchise-laws-sparked-by-tesla-go-too-far-otherautomakers [https://perma.cc/3NJF-VXAR] [hereinafter “State Franchise Laws, Sparked by
Tesla”] (discussing how dealers’ opposition to Tesla’s direct-sale model has led states to
propose laws defending franchised dealers).
435. Id.
436. See Philip Delves Broughton, Warren Buffett, Elon Musk, and the Future of Car
Sales, NEW YORKER (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/warrenbuffett-elon-musk-future-car-sales [https://perma.cc/TR4A-E5JZ] (comparing the business
strategies taken by Warren Buffett and Elon Musk within the automobile industry).
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with this sentiment based off of the public’s perception of the “car
salesman.”437 The dealership franchising business has been characterized as
having a “middleman effect” on the sales process, where the dealer’s
presence increases the prices of the products sold. Studies indicate that the
dealer system adds 5 percent to 10 percent to the cost of each vehicle
produced.438
This “middleman effect” does not only yield negative results for the
consumer, however. As middlemen, dealers operate as liaisons for the
consumer to the manufacturer. In a technology-driven and evolving society,
it is important for consumers to get the most for their money and have their
concerns addressed promptly, especially with a crucial product as important
and costly as a vehicle. Without dealers, it is difficult to envision how
consumers will have all of their needs met, especially without the “personal
factor” that dealers bring to the local communities where they operate and
often have a longstanding and intimate familiarity; these dealers’ markets
have the economic or social circumstances, demographics, and key business
people and other leaders that dealers typically have worked and lived around,
as well as learned from, usually for many years, if not a lifetime.
CONCLUSION
In sum, dealers and their proponents claim that, as an entity, they are in
place to protect the consumer.439 In contrast, consumers appreciate options
and liberty in choosing what works best for them. Tesla’s business goal
seems to project the same sentiment: “to accelerate the advent of sustainable
transport by bringing compelling mass market electric cars to market as soon

437. See Neil Kokemuller, The Disadvantages of Being a Car Salesman, HOUSTON
CHRON., http://work.chron.com/disadvantages-being-car-salesman-12773.html [https://perm
a.cc/8DCG-7LC7] (last visited Nov. 26, 2018) (listing the disadvantages to being a car
salesman).
438. See Brett Berk, Do We Really Need Car Dealerships Anymore?, Popular Mechanic
Blog, (July 30, 2013), http://www.popularmechanics.com/cars/a9265/do-we-really-need-cardealerships-anymore-15748322/ [https://perma.cc/G5H4-THKR] (assessing several
arguments in favor of the dealership franchise system).
439. See, e.g., Claudia Assis, Tesla Vows to Keep Selling Cars Directly to Missouri
Customers, MARKETWATCH (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/teslavows-to-keep-selling-cars-directly-to-missouri-consumers-2016-09-08/ [https://perma.cc/S4
CK-B7LG] (describing dealer argument that dealers protect consumers); Auto Dealers Chief
Wars of Tesla Direct Sales Model, supra note 393 (describing dealer argument that dealers
lower the price of vehicles for consumers); State Franchise Laws, Sparked by Tesla, supra
note 434 (explaining how dealer-backed legislation is shifting the dealer-automaker
relationship too far in favor of dealers).
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as possible.”440 Tesla’s direct sales model achieves this goal while also
eliminating the franchise-dealer/middlemen costs that are passed along to the
consumer in the traditional franchise-dealer system. Indeed, if the Big Three
intend to avoid another bailout, adjust to the Internet age, and remain viable
and competitive as companies domestically and against their much more
efficient international competition in the long run, the franchisee-dealer
system, and its associated costs, may need to become a thing of the past—
or, inevitably, the U.S. auto industry, itself, may become a thing of the past.

440. Maxwell J. Levine, Why Resist Tesla’s Direct Sales Model?, MIAMI BUS. L. REV.
(Feb. 13, 2015), available at http://business-law-review.law.miami.edu/resist-teslas-directsales-model/ [https://perma.cc/CV9M-TSV2] (evaluating the pros and cons of the direct-sales
model and the dealership sales model).

